Journal article
Government protection, political connection and management turnover in China
International Review of Economics & Finance, Vol.45, pp.160-176
2016
Abstract
Mainland Chinese government employs two related strategies to protect its national and economic interests in the process of financial liberalization. It grants government protection to industries of national interest. In addition, it also maintains political-linkage with certain firms to assert their influence. We term these firms as strategic firms. We argue these strategic firms with economic and national interests demonstrate better performance and higher management turnovers. Management turnovers are less frequent if the chairpersons and CEOs are politically-connected. The strategic firms also rebound better from financial distress than non-strategic firms.
Details
- Title
- Government protection, political connection and management turnover in China
- Authors
- Louis Cheng (Corresponding Author) - Hong Kong Polytechnic UniversityT Y Leung (Author) - Open University of Hong Kong
- Publication details
- International Review of Economics & Finance, Vol.45, pp.160-176
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.iref.2016.03.010
- ISSN
- 1873-8036
- Organisation Unit
- School of Business and Creative Industries
- Language
- English
- Record Identifier
- 99710572402621
- Output Type
- Journal article
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