Board leadership, outside directors’ expertise and voluntary corporate disclosures

Ferdinand A. Gul; Sidney Leung

doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2004.07.001

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Board leadership, outside directors’ expertise and voluntary corporate disclosures

Journal article

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Board leadership, outside directors’ expertise and voluntary corporate disclosures

Ferdinand A. Gul and Sidney Leung

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol.23(5), pp.351-379

2004

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2004.07.001

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Abstract

CEO duality

Corporate disclosures

Corporate governance

Non-executive director expertise

This study examines the linkages between board leadership structure in terms of CEO duality (CEOs who jointly serve as board chairs), the proportion of expert outside directors on the board (PENEDs) and voluntary corporate disclosures. Regression analyses of observations from 385 Hong Kong companies show that CEO duality is associated with lower levels of voluntary corporate disclosures. However, the negative CEO duality/voluntary disclosure association is weaker for firms with higher PENEDs suggesting that the expertise of non-executive directors (NEDs) moderates the CEO duality/corporate disclosures relationship.

Details

Title: Board leadership, outside directors’ expertise and voluntary corporate disclosures
Authors: Ferdinand A. Gul (Author) - City University of Hong Kong
Sidney Leung (Corresponding Author) - City University of Hong Kong
Publication details: Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol.23(5), pp.351-379
Publisher: Elsevier Inc.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2004.07.001
ISSN: 1873-2070
Organisation Unit: University of the Sunshine Coast, Queensland; School of Business and Creative Industries
Language: English
Record Identifier: 99679189102621
Output Type: Journal article

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