Conference presentation
AI Replicas of the Dead: Psychological Continuity or Objectification
Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference , 2024 (Perth, Australia, 07-Jul-2024–11-Jul-2024)
2024
Abstract
That AI can be used to create a digital version of us is no longer science fiction nor the focus of abstract thought experiments. I consider both the technical and ethical limitations of deadbots, thanabots, digital clones, or digital ghosts and the nascent digital afterlife industry. Firstly, I consider Derek Parfit's (1984) argument that what matters for survival is a psychological continuity of memories, beliefs or attitudes. If what matters is psychological continuity, then these services are creating real continuous versions of ourselves. If this view is wrong, and what is being created are merely replicas, then I argue that there are more concerning ethical issues. I develop a Kantian view according to which the practice of developing deadbots reduces another person to an object or thing - a means by which we satisfy our grief when they die. In doing so we cease to respect the entire circumstances of the person as a human being. For the practice of deadbots to be genuinely ethical, we must accept that these digital versions are truly continuities of a person. Otherwise, we have turned loved ones merely into instruments for our own grief which cannot be ethically justified.
Details
- Title
- AI Replicas of the Dead: Psychological Continuity or Objectification
- Authors
- Declan Humphreys - University of the Sunshine Coast, Queensland, School of Science, Technology and Engineering
- Conference details
- Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference , 2024 (Perth, Australia, 07-Jul-2024–11-Jul-2024)
- Date published
- 2024
- Organisation Unit
- School of Science, Technology and Engineering
- Language
- English
- Record Identifier
- 991102546302621
- Output Type
- Conference presentation
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