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Perspectives on the Effectiveness of the Late Night Liquor Trading Lockout Legislative Provision

Gavan Palk¹, Jeremy Davey², James Freeman³ & Hannah Morgan⁴

Abstract

The effectiveness of ‘the lockout policy’ integrated within a broader police enforcement strategy to reduce alcohol-related harm, in and around late-night licensed premises, in major drinking precincts was examined. First response operational police (n= 280) recorded all alcohol and non alcohol-related incidents they attended in and around late-night liquor trading premises. A before and after study design was used, with police completing modified activity logs prior to and following the introduction of the lockout policy in two policing regions: Gold Coast (n = 12,801 incidents); Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley (n = 9,117 incidents). Qualitative information from key stakeholders (e.g., Police, Security Staff & Politicians n = 20) was also obtained. The number of alcohol-related offences requiring police attention was significantly reduced in some policing areas and for some types of offences (e.g., sex offences, street disturbances, traffic incidents. However, there was no variation for a number of other offence categories (e.g., assault). Interviews with licensees revealed that although all were initially opposed to the lockout policy, most perceived benefits from its introduction. This study was the first of its kind to comprehensively examine the impact of a lockout policy and provides supportive evidence for the effectiveness of the lockout policy as integrating positively with police enforcement to enhance public safety in some areas in and around late-night liquor trading premises.

Keywords - alcohol policy, crime prevention policy, violence
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Internationally, alcohol-related violence and drunken disorder is a major burden to the community and has a substantial impact on police resources (Cookson, 1992; Davey & French, 1995; Dingle, 2006; Greenfeld, 1998; Pernanen, Cousineau, Brochu & Sun, 2002; Richardson & Budd, 2003). Currently the majority of drinking occurs in bars and clubs whereby patrons leave venues intoxicated, leading to cases of violence on the streets of high density drinking venues (Doherty & Roche, 2003). Recent research in Queensland (Australia) involving a large scale study encompassing urban, regional and rural areas indicates that a substantial proportion of current police work (i.e., 25%) involves attendance at alcohol-related incidents (Palk, Davey & Freeman, 2007a, 2007b).

Currently police enforce alcohol-related crime using the following key mechanisms: enforcing the liquor licensing laws and responding to drunk, disorderly and offensive behaviour and taking action to reduce the risk (Doherty & Roche, 2003). However, these police enforcement strategies are limited due to the difficulties in: obtaining successful prosecutions, operationalising police enforcement activities, licensing laws, and due to a dilution of officer knowledge and skills in the area (Doherty & Roche, 2003). It is therefore suggested by policing research (Doherty & Roche) that the approach of the police should embrace an intelligence-based role operating in a collaborative relationship with liquor licensing and licensing venues to achieve the shared goal of reducing alcohol-related harm.

Alcohol-related Harms

Not surprisingly, Australians are becoming increasingly concerned about problems associated with alcohol misuse in the community. Studies in Australia, suggest that alcohol is a major contributor to events within the community that require police attendance (Arro, Crook, G., & Fenton, 1992; Davey & French, 1995; Ireland &
Thommeny, 1993). A significant proportion of risky/harmful drinking occurs in and around Australian licensed premises (pubs, nightclubs & hotels) (Lang Stockwell, Rydon, & Gamble 1992). In major cities such as Brisbane and the Gold Coast, large numbers of licensed venues operate within a small section of the city precinct, causing patron hordes in these areas, particularly on Friday and Saturday nights until the early morning (Block & Block, 1995; Jochelson, 1997).

The associated crime with alcohol use is most likely to involve young males who engage in occasional excessive drinking as well as acts of violence and public disorder (Briscoe & Donnelly, 2001a; Homel, Thomsen, & Thommeny, 1997; Homel, Thomsen, Thommeny, 1991; Jochelson, 1997; Stockwell, 1997; Stockwell, Masters, Phillips, Daly, Gahegan, Midford, & Philp, 1998). In addition, it has been found that approximately 50% of non criminal traffic offences and other types of criminal offences were committed by individuals aged between 10 and 24 years. Moreover, the vast majority of assaults and public disorder are associated with a minority of licensed premises that have extended trading hours (Briscoe & Donnelly 2001b; Briscoe & Donnelly, 2003; Considine, Walker, Wiggers, Daly, Hazel, & Fairhill; Chikrizhs, Stockwell, & Masters, 1997).

The fact that a substantive proportion of alcohol-related crime is associated with routine alcohol consumption activities of young males tends to lend credence to place based theories of crime (e.g., routine activities theory, rational choice theory & crime pattern theory). Place based theories of crime (see Cohen & Felson, 1979; Cornish & Clark, 1986; Eck & Weisburd, 1995) emphasise the importance of place, time and rational choice (though unsophisticated) in the context of physical and social factors that may encourage violence and disorder. Crime pattern theory (see Eck & Weisburd, 1995) in particular, suggests that crime is most likely to occur at specific
times and places during the routine activities of motivated offenders who make rational choices about the risks and benefits of their actions. When the risk of being caught is reduced by the absence of capable guardians such as intimate handlers (e.g., spouse or influential friend) and controllers or place managers (e.g., security officers & police) to regulate behaviour, crime and disorder are more prevalent. Computer mapping and geo-referencing of crime along with other temporal and spatial crime research demonstrates that crime is not a random event but occurs in concentrated places at certain times referred to as “Hot Spots” especially where alcohol is available. (Block & Block, 1995; Jochelson, 1997: Palk & Davey, 2005; Teece & Williams, 2000).

Hence, place based theories of crimes suggest that crime and disorder can be reduced by manipulating key environmental factors that are viewed as providing opportunities and inducements to engage in socially deviant behaviour. Place based theories of crime are closely associated with the development of situational crime prevention theory (Clark, 1997, 1995, 1983, 1980) that advocates implementing environmental strategies to reduce the attractiveness and rewards associated with crime thereby reducing the opportunities to commit crime.

**Safer Drinking Practices**

Various regulatory interventions founded on the principles of place based and situational crime prevention theories of crime have been established in Australian communities to reduce alcohol-related harm which have experienced varying levels of success. The underlying behavioural change theory of regulatory interventions is structural change caused by environmental constraints (reducing attractiveness & rewards associated with alcohol misuse) rather than a conscious decision to change. Regulatory interventions are aimed at reducing community wide unsafe drinking
practices by establishing control over: licensed venue regulations, hours of sale, the
quantity permitted and price of alcohol (Babor, Caetano, Casswell, et al., 2003, 2010).

Regulatory interventions implemented in Australia include: the restriction of
alcohol availability by increasing the price to purchase alcohol through taxation. This
was found to lead to a 54% reduction in sales of ready-to-drink alcohol beverages
(RTD’s) from April to June 2008 (Chikritzhs, Dietze. Allsop, Daube, Hall, & Kypri,
2009). It has been noted that youth are more sensitive to price changes than the rest of
the population. In addition, restricting the settings of legal alcohol use has been found
to be an effective strategy in reducing alcohol-related harm (Toumbourou, 2007).
These interventions have had limited evaluation, however show promising effects at
least in the short-term sustainability of safer drinking practices.

The effectiveness of a community-based intervention is more likely to be
enhanced when working within the existing community infrastructure (Wortel, de
Vries, & de Geus, 1995). Community action safety projects working within the
community infrastructure (Hauritz, Homel, McIlwain, Burrows, & Townsley, 1998;
Homel et al., 1997; Wickes, Mazerolle & Risely, 2005) have been found to enhance
safer drinking practices. In addition, proactive enforcement of liquor licensing laws
through the coordination of a number of government agencies has been prominent in
the Gold Coast area for a number of years (Liquor Enforcement and Proactive
Strategies (LEAPS) (Roche & Inglis, 1999).

Lockout Legislation
Restricting the availability through hours and days of sale and reducing the number
and types of licensing venues has been found to reduce alcohol-related problems
(Barbor et al., 2003, 2010). A crime prevention strategy recently introduced in
Australia is the lockout legislation strategy. This strategy was specifically
implemented in response to public concern about alcohol-related violence and disorder associated with patrons moving between licensed premises in the early morning of Friday and Saturday nights. Effectively the lockout policy prevents patrons from entering late-night liquor trading establishments between the hours of 3am and 5am. However, patrons who are inside the licensed premise may remain inside and continue to consume alcohol until the time of closing at 5am.

The lockout policy as a crime prevention strategy appears to have been utilised only within Australia and has not been evaluated extensively to date. One impact study investigating its effectiveness relates to the imposition of a 3am lockout on all late-night entertainment venues in the Central Business District (CBD) of the City of Ballarat, Victoria, Australia (Operation Link: Be Safe Late Program (OLBSL), 2004). Significant reductions related to assaults in licensed premises (47.5%) and public places (33.3%) were achieved following the introduction of the lockout.

It is suggested that the lockout policy will reduce harmful drinking behaviours leading to alcohol-related crimes via a mechanism of structural change imposed by the environmental constraint the legislation poses, with restricted hours of drinking, rather than a conscious decision to change. However, this may therefore lead to patron tension, as the change is forced upon them rather than patrons actively choosing their drinking behaviour. It is thought that due to the inconvenience of resuming drinking behaviours in private residence combined with reduced public transport at 3am will deter any temporal displacement of drinking at alternative venues.

Aim of Study

The aim of the current study is to build upon previous preliminary research (Palk, Davey & Freeman, 2010) reporting that a lockout legislative strategy introduced on
the Gold Coast Queensland Australia may reduce specific types of alcohol-related offences. In the current study, the Gold Coast lockout policy results are more extensively examined and compared to other late-night entertainment areas (Brisbane City & Fortitude Valley) in which the lockout policy was introduced at a later date. A before and after design was employed to examine the changes in alcohol-related offences, in particular, the number of alcohol-related incidents across all major offence categories.

In addition to this quantitative analysis of the outcomes of the lockout policy, the experiences of licensees and other key stakeholders (Police, Security Staff & Politicians) involved with or affected by the implementation of the lockout policy were sought through interviews.

Method

Outcome Study (quantitative analysis)

Participants, Materials and Procedure

The participants in the current study were first response operational police officers (general duties police officers) from the Gold Coast Police District \((n = 180)\), Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley (Valley) \((n = 500)\). These areas were chosen for the study specifically due to their association with the late-night entertainment industry and the fact that the lockout policy had been initially trialled in these police precincts. Over the study period, general duties police officers completing their usual activity logs were also required to identify the type, time spent on, and the number of incidents attended at which persons involved were affected by alcohol or other drugs. Determination of whether an incident should be recorded as alcohol-related or not was made by the individual Officers involved based on their professional experience and training provided to participate in the current study (see below). The associated
limitations of this process are highlighted in the discussion section. Police officers also recorded demographic factors including, the age and gender of persons as well as the time and location of offences and incidents.

The lockout policy was introduced on the Gold Coast on the 29 March 2004. The study commenced 4 weeks prior to this (before phase) and continued for 5 weeks after the introduction of the lockout (pre-post test design). The lockout strategy was subsequently introduced in Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley Police precincts on the 1st April 2005 and data collection in this area was conducted over an 8 week period (4 weeks prior and 4 weeks after the introduction of the lockout. Appropriate statistics were conducted to account for the differing post test data values for the Gold Coast and Brisbane area. Due to the slightly different pre and post time periods for the Gold Coast data, statistics were analysed proportionally to account for these differences.

Police officers received training in how to complete the modified activity logs and were provided with written instructions on how to accurately record incidents involved with alcohol and other illicit substances. In addition, a co-ordinator was available throughout the study period to provide guidance to general duties police requiring assistance to identify the category of offence and whether or not the incident should be considered alcohol-related. Several research assistants were also employed to code and input the data into the Microsoft Excel and to examine the modified activity logs to ensure that the category of offences were correctly recorded and that incidents were correctly identified as involving alcohol or an illicit substance.

**Data Analysis**

Details of the time of the offence, offence type, place of incident, persons involved, and importantly, whether alcohol was involved in the incident were transferred from the modified police activity logs into a computer database for analysis using the
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences version 14.0 (SPSS V 14.0). Unless otherwise stated, tests were conducted using a significance level of $\alpha = .05$

In order to examine when the offences were committed, time of offence was categorised into three main time periods (12am-3am, 3am-6am, 6am-9am) of three hours duration. This allowed for a comparison between proportions of offences committed immediately prior to, during and following the lockout times of the early morning. The three hour time period was chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, it provided an opportunity to ensure there would be a sufficient number of alcohol-related incidents to provide statistical power for analysis. Secondly, although the doors to the venues were only locked for two hours (3am-5am), the authors were interested in examining whether the lockout policy could prevent or increase the level of public disorder and violence in the proceeding hour after the lockout was over and licensed premises were closed. This time period is crucial as it is the time when patrons exit licensed premises and make their way home by a variety of means, including public transport that may require waiting for periods in taxi ranks. Finally, it was thought important to look for differences in the incidence of offences amongst the three key time periods in order to investigate whether there was any displacement of alcohol-related incidents or diffusion benefits into surrounding times as a result of the lockout policy. However, complementary analyses were undertaken (where appropriate) for offences that occurred between 3-5am as compared to 3-6am.

**The Interview Study: Design and Methodology**

**Participants, Materials and Procedure**

This part of the study utilised purposive sampling techniques (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Guba & Lincoln; 1989) to enable the identification of key participants from within the lockout operational geographical locations. These key people were closely
associated with critical aspects of either the implementation of the lockout policy or its enforcement and were therefore able to provide rich comment on the processes involved from a perspective internal to the intervention. The perspectives of those directly affected by the policy (that is owners/operators of licensed premises affected by the lockout policy) were also interviewed. The final sample of those interviewed included state and local political representatives from within the lockout study areas ($n = 5$) police and liquor licensing managers who were involved in developing, implementing and enforcing the lockout legislative provisions ($n = 5$) and owners/operators ($n = 10$) of licensed premises that had extended liquor trading permits to 5am.

Face-face interviews of 1-2 hour’s duration were conducted by the first author with all except one participant, who preferred to respond in detail in writing rather than being interviewed. Participants were provided with an interview schedule prior to the time of the interview. This schedule consisted of a set of open ended questions about perceptions of the benefits, pitfalls and effectiveness of the lockout policy, possible factors that might impede or facilitate its operational success, and the socio/political context surrounding its introduction. Participants’ ideas about measures that could be used to improve the lockout policy were also sought. During the interviews, the interviewer used probing questions to clarify responses where necessary and to seek further information about participants’ experience with the lockout policy.

Due to the sensitive nature of the lockout policy and because some participants had expressed concern about being identified, interviews were not taped. Instead, notes of participants’ responses were taken by the interviewer during the interview. Before finishing the interview, the interviewer checked the accuracy of the notes with
the participant. This allowed participants the opportunity to correct any misunderstandings or to clarify points. These notes were then given a code in order to further protect the anonymity of participants. Following the interviews, the first author rewrote and then typed the responses of the participants. In some instances, further clarification of responses were sought from participants to ensure the first author had accurately recorded the participants’ responses.

**Analysis**

The information gathered from the participants was based partly on the principles of grounded theory that entails categorising participants’ responses into major coded themes without preconceived ideas (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The participants’ responses were reread by the first author a number of times utilising a qualitative content analytic approach that was both comparative and constant (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1997). This enabled the first author to discover and portray the recurring major themes.

Thematic analysis (van Mansen, 1990) was used to identify major and minor themes within the interview notes. In order to ensure accuracy in this identification, an independent researcher also conducted a thematic analysis and findings were compared with those of the interviewer (eg., inter-rater reliability). The themes were finally compared within and across interviews in order to increase the reliability of the interpretations. The coded themes were devised to reflect the study’s pre-determined open ended questions. Additional codes were also constructed to represent other relevant information obtained during the interview process.

**Comparison of both Quantitative and Qualitative Data**

As mentioned, the Lockout legislative provision was introduced in the major night time entertainment precincts of Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley
approximately one year after its introduction in the Gold Coast Police District. Due to the time difference it was therefore considered inappropriate to merge the data obtained for the Gold Coast in 2004 and Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley obtained in 2005 for a direct analytical comparison. Separate statistical analyses were undertaken for the three late-night entertainment areas and caution should be excised in directly comparing the Gold Coast data and the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley data. As the Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley data were collected during the same time frame (April/May 2004), direct comparisons are possible. Most of quantitative data for the three late-night entertainment areas are depicted in the same tables for ease of presentation and space limitations.

However, as this study was also interested in gathering qualitative information about the implementation process of the lockout policy, it is worth comparing the data from the Gold Coast area with data for the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley and exploring both qualitative and quantitative trends.

**Results**

**Characteristics of Sample**

During the study period a total of 12,801 and 9,117 incidents that required police attendance were recorded as individual log entries by participating police officers (n=280) in the Gold Coast Police District and the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley Police precincts, respectively. At the time of the study, there were approximately 757 venues licensed to sell liquor on the Gold Coast. The majority of these alcohol outlets were located in Surfers Paradise (268, 35.4%) and Broadbeach (134, 17.7%) and closed between the hours of 10pm and 3am. Surfers Paradise and Broadbeach were the only locations in which hotels or nightclubs traded until 5am. Only 25(3.3%) licensed premises in the Gold Coast area at the time of the study had extended trading
permits allowing them to remain open until 5am. Additionally, most of these licensed premises (23) are located in a small geographical area at Surfers Paradise.

In the Brisbane area, there are two main precincts, which are approximately three kilometres from each other, Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley, in which late-night entertainment is popular. At the time of the study and in the location of the study there were approximately 247 venues in Brisbane City licensed to sell liquor. The majority of them (230, 86.5%) closed between 10pm and 3am. Only a small number of licensed premises were permitted to trade until 5am (17, 14.5%). In the area of Fortitude Valley in which the study was conducted, there were approximately 146 venues licensed to sell liquor. Of these, 31 (21%) were permitted to trade until 5am.

Although the majority of late-night liquor trading premises in the Gold Coast and Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley areas were approached for the purposes of the study, only 10 (13.7%) of a total 73 late-night trading licensed premises agreed to participate in the study.

**Quantitative Analysis**

Table 1 depicts the number of incidents requiring police attendance in and around licensed premises before and after the lockout legislative provision was introduced. The Chi-square test revealed that there is a significant difference in the number of alcohol-related incidents before and after the introduction of lockout for all time periods (across 24 hours) in the Gold Coast Police District, even after considering a Bonferroni correction [\( \chi^2(1, N = 12,799) = 15.98, p < 0.0001, \text{odds ratio} = 1.2 \)] (Table 1). In respect to alcohol-related incidents in the Gold Coast area during the 3am-6am time period before and after the lockout was introduced, the Chi-square test showed there were significantly fewer alcohol-related incidents between 3am-6am after the
lockout was introduced \[ \chi^2(1, N = 842) = 11.9, p = 0.0005, \text{odds ratio} = 1.7 \] (Table 1). A similar analysis utilising the 3-5am timeframe (as compared to 3-6am) was also implemented which produced similar results.

While the data for the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley was collected 12 months after the Gold Coast data, the same hourly time periods before and after the introduction of the lockout were used. No significant differences were found for alcohol-related incidents across all the time periods following the introduction of the lockout in the Brisbane City \[ \chi^2(1, N = 5156) = 0.19, p = 0.66, \text{odds ratio} = 1.0 \] and Fortitude Valley \[ \chi^2(1, N = 3368) = 1.50, p = 0.22, \text{odds ratio} = 1.1 \] Police Precincts (Table 1). In addition, there were no significant differences for alcohol-related incidents between the 3am-6am time period after the introduction of the lockout legislative provision in the Brisbane City \[ \chi^2(1, N = 780) = 0.051, p = 0.82, \text{odds ratio} = 1.1 \] or the Fortitude Valley \[ \chi^2(1, N = 322) = 0.64, p = 0.42, \text{odds ratio} = 1.2 \] (Table 1).

The second quantitative examination focussed on investigating the impact of the lockout legislative provision on the prevalence of the major category of offences more likely to occur during late-night liquor trading across a 24 hour period. Table 2 highlights the specific number and percentages of alcohol-related incidents for each of the major category of offences across all time periods (i.e., 24 hours). Due to space limitations, only Chi-squares and odd ratios for events that were significant are reported. As shown in Table 2, there were significantly fewer street/disturbances (12.3\%) \[ \chi^2(1, N = 321) = 5.39, p = 0.02, \text{odds ratio} = 1.75 \] and sexual offences (33.7\%) \[ \chi^2(1, N = 80) = 8.49, p = 0.004, \text{odds ratio} = 4.4 \] after the introduction of
the lockout policy in the Gold Coast Police District. While downward trends were observed in the other three major categories of offences (Traffic, Assaults & Personal Trauma) in the Gold Coast area, no significant differences were recorded (see Table 2). Additionally, while alcohol-related disturbances/disputes were reduced by 6.2%, this difference is not considered significant after making a Bonferroni correction to accommodate for implementing multiple chi-square analyses \( \chi^2(1, N = 1030) = 3.38, p = 0.05, \text{ odds ratio} = 1.3 \).

An examination of the major categories of offences involving alcohol before and after the lockout in the Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley Police precincts revealed little variation (Table 2). Some categories experienced an upward trend while others experienced a downward trend. However, the only major offence category to experience a significant change following the introduction of the lockout policy involved personal trauma. There were 30% less alcohol-related trauma offences in the Fortitude Valley after the lockout was introduced \( \chi^2(1, N = 129) = 13.7, p = 0.000, \text{ odds ratio} = 0.19 \).

**INSERT TABLE 2 HERE**

The third quantitative examination concentrated on examining the impact of the lockout legislative provision on the prevalence of the major category of offences more likely to occur during late-night liquor trading during the three key three hour time periods (12am-3am, 3am-6am & 6am-9am). Tables 3 and 4 highlight the specific number and percentages of alcohol-related incidents for each of the major category of offences occurring during the three hourly time periods as well as for offences occurring in all other times periods.

Only Chi-squares and odd ratios for significant results are depicted due to space limitations and Bonferroni corrections were implemented to accommodate
multiple chi-square analyses. As shown in Table 3, that depicts the percentages of alcohol-related offences for the key three hour time periods on the Gold Coast before and after the introduction of the lockout, significant differences were found for only a few of the offence categories. The Chi-square test revealed the disturbance/disputes involving alcohol were 19.2% less likely to occur after the introduction of the lockout \[ \chi^2(1, N = 175) = 5.72, p = 0.01, \text{odds ratio} = 2.43 \] during the 12am-3am time period. Street disturbances were also less likely (17.9%) to occur after the introduction of the lockout \[ \chi^2(1, N = 138) = 4.37, p = 0.02, \text{odds ratio} = 2.07 \] during all the other time periods. Sexual offences were also less likely (29.2%) to occur after the introduction of the lockout \[ \chi^2(1, N = 54) = 4.33, p = 0.03, \text{odds ratio} 4.29 \] during all the other time periods. Traffic offences were more likely (4.5%) to occur after the introduction of the lockout \[ \chi^2(1, N = 1835) = 3.37, p = 0.03, \text{odds ratio 0.82} \] during all other time periods. It is noted that while there were some significant variations for non lockout time periods, no significant variations were recorded during the lockout time period. A similar series of analyses were undertaken for offences that occurred between 3-5am (as compared to 3-6am) which produced similar results, as significant reductions were again found among disturbances/disputes, street disturbances and sexual offences.

**Table 3**

Table 4 shows the percentage of alcohol-related offences for the three main time periods (12am-3am, 3am-6am & 6am-9am) and for all other time periods for the police precincts in Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley (Valley). There were only a few significant variations noted for some of the major categories of alcohol-related offences, after making Bonferroni correction adjustments. The only significant variation to occur in the Brisbane City area involved traffic offences during the 3am-
6am time period. There were significantly fewer traffic offences (12.9%) following the introduction of the lockout $\chi^2(1, N = 157) = 4.19, p = 0.03$, odds ratio 0.41].

There were a number of significant variations in the Fortitude Valley area. Street disturbances were significantly reduced by 16% [ $\chi^2(1, N = 130) = 3.20, p = 0.05$, odds ratio 0.52] and personal trauma offences were also significantly decreased by 14.6% [ $\chi^2(1, N = 85) = 4.32, p = 0.03$, odds ratio 0.33] during all other time periods. In respect to alcohol-related disturbances/disputes, these types of offences were significantly decreased (29.0%) [ $\chi^2(1, N = 57) = 4.31, p = 0.03$, odds ratio 0.30] during the 12am-3am time period but there was a significant increase (33.8%) during the 3am-6am time period $\chi^2(1, N = 48) = 5.58, p = 0.02$, odds ratio 4.32]. Similar to above, a series of analyses were undertaken for offences that occurred between 3-5am (as compared to 3-6am) which identified the same significant outcomes e.g., reductions in personal trauma and alcohol-related disturbances.

**INSERT TABLE 4 HERE**

The final quantitative examination analysed the proportional differences between the key time periods (12am-3am, 3am-6am & 6am-9am) to assess for possible displacement and diffusion benefit effects of the major alcohol-related offence categories. There was no evidence that the lockout policy resulted in a displacement or reduction (diffusion benefits) of alcohol-related offences to non lockout time periods, particularly those time periods prior to and following the lockout period. In addition, a review of offence trends reported by the QPS (Queensland Police Service, 2004) revealed no corresponding overall decreases in offending rates during the current study period. Similarly, the most recent analysis of trends in alcohol-related violence in Australia indicates the prevalence rates have remained relatively stable over a decade (Matthews, Chikritzhs, Stockwell, & Donath,
2002). In contrast, there was virtually no recorded change for traffic offences (a slight increase of 0.8%). Furthermore, while reductions were evident for offences against the person (10.8%), property (0.8%) and stealing (1.7%), these levels did not reach statistical significance.

Qualitative Analysis

A number of key themes emerged in response to the semi-structured interviews with the stakeholders affected by (or involved with) the lockout policy. These themes were grouped under the following headings: Advantages and Disadvantages of Lockout Policy; Transport Concerns; Public Safety and Security Issues; and Implementation Process Issues. A number of issues under these key themes were raised by the sample and participants’ quotes are identified by the letter p and a number to preserve anonymity. The letters gg appearing after the letter and number indicates the participant was from the Gold Coast. All other participants were from the Brisbane and Fortitude Valley areas.

Advantages of Lockout Policy

In regards to managing intoxicated persons, a major theme was that licensees indicated that door staff and crowd controllers felt that the lockout policy provided a means to exclude the most troublesome patrons: “Door staff, crowd controllers love the lockout gives patrons them an excuse to keep the really intoxicated out” (p15, p12, p17, p18). “No reduction inside (p18)”. “Most patrons out at this hour are the troublesome ones” (p1). Most trying to get in that hour are usually unwelcome” (p10).

Views about street behaviour and violence were evenly mixed with some participants believing that there were fewer problems related to transport, crowding and violence on the street while others believed the lockout policy had no affect on these issues. Most licensees denied there are any major problems related to violence
in their premises and importantly, indicated that violence was more likely to occur on the streets around licensed premises: “Quieter less violence on the street” (p7, p9, p12). Less transport problems” (p7). “Reduced patron traffic outside & around venue after 3am. Trouble is on the streets not in the clubs” (p14). Not much difference for violence does clear up before 6am, patrons not hanging around” (p15). “No reduction” (p19).

In relation to the impact of the lockout policy on business revenue, a theme to emerge was that most licensees indicated that patron numbers and income remained largely unaffected by the lockout policy. The majority of licensees stated that they were initially opposed to the introduction of the lockout because they felt it would have a negative impact on income revenue. However, once the lockout was introduced, licensees implemented novel marketing practices and changes in business practices to retain patrons within the licensed premise during the lockout time period. In fact the licensees believed that these strategies coupled with the lockout policy in fact improved patron numbers and income revenue: “In most ways it has benefited our business. Mainly it has helped us to hold our patrons later into the night and increased revenue” (p19). Profit not greatly affected” (p10, p11). “Now doing better due to management strategies. Before lockout patrons leave between 2am & 3am but now locking them in between 3-5am” (p14). Business increase due to marketing strategies” (p14). “Business gone up due to smoking laws. Initially opposed to it (lockout) but now good for business, less people to go to the Valley” (p18).

Disadvantages of Lockout Policy

When the lockout was first introduced, some door staff reported that they encountered an increase in aggression towards them when patrons were refused entry: “Initially
when lockout started door staff encountered increased violence towards them when entry refused” (p7).

A theme also emerged regarding concern being expressed about the long waiting lines on footpaths created by patrons while they were trying to enter licensed premises and the potential for these patrons to be struck by motor vehicles. There was some perception that violence on the street was still at similar levels prior to the lockout. However, police reported that it was much quieter and almost like a ghost town during the lockout policy time period. At least one licensee believed that the lockout had created behavioural problems for two time periods (3am & 5am) in relation to patrons trying to gain access to licensed premises or trying to obtain a taxi.

Previously, Licensees indicated that there was only one time period (5am) in which most behavioural problems occurred: “Less problems inside (p12gg) “...but has created more problems outside according to security companies” (p8). “No decrease in violence on streets, just come around here at 3am and you can see the violence” (p13gg). More violence on the street, big events line up six deep, danger from cars and trucks” (p15). “No less violence on the streets (16), problems initially at 5am, now at 3am and 5am, can’t get into clubs, take problems out on taxi drivers” (p17). Clubs being made responsible for street violence, to a point this is okay (p19).

Another theme to emerge was that some licensees also felt that both interstate and international visitors were confused about the lockout as they had not experienced this sort of initiative in their local area: “Not aware of lockout & have difficulty understanding it” (p7, p13). There was also a belief among licensees that the lockout had caused some anxiety among patrons as to which licensed premise they would prefer to be in just before the lockout commenced. In addition, patrons who chose licensed premises without designated smoking areas could not leave the premises for
a smoke during the lockout due to a no smoking policy in licensed premises that had been recently introduced by the State government. If patrons did leave for a smoke they could not re-enter the licensed premise or any other licensed premise. A similar problem was created for patrons who may have wished to leave licensed premises to calm down after experiencing some conflict with other patrons: “No opportunity to leave in order to cool off, get some fresh air, have a smoke, come back later” (p7, p9). “Some patrons become agitated just before 3am as to where they want to go between 3am-5am. Instead of staying in until 4am patrons leave at 2:45am” (p11). “Hard to see any pluses, lack of police after lockout (9p13gg), no change, most people at that time you knock back” (p18). Calibre of patron not high – 40% drop in business” (p19).

In relation to transport concerns, advantages and disadvantages were noted with some participants feeling that waiting times for taxis had improved during the lockout time period: “No massive line up now between 3am-5am, but problem now between 12am-3am, massive transport problem” (p7). “Increases- taxi issue now between 12am-3am (p9).” “Prior to 3am terrible, after 3am not too bad depending on where you are, reasonable near venue” (p9).

However, a number of participants clearly believed that the lockout strategy had in fact created two rush hours to access public transport whereas previously there had only been one. Another theme to emerge was the general perception that waiting lines were extremely long and public transport (buses, train & taxis) was poorly coordinated: “There are two rush hours now instead of one patrons leave before 3am to go home or enter another nightclub before lockout and another rush occurs at 5am” (p8, p15, p12). Prior to lockout rush hour was 4:30am-6am” (p12). “Public Transport poorly coordinated, not efficient…taxis ranks a mile long” (p1, p2, p15, p17).
Public Safety and Security

A problem noted by one participant related to a group of homeless people who hung around licensed premises. This group of people were generally not patrons of licensed premises, but rather spent time hanging around them looking for opportunities to score illicit drugs or approach people for money. This problem appeared to be more prevalent in the mall areas of Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley rather than in the Gold Coast area: “There are a group of people that hang around the malls in Brisbane…. they use illicit drugs and pose a problem…. and they are not associated with the pubs and clubs” (p8).

Other safety concerns that emerged as themes related to a lack of police and security presence and police being generally too slow to respond to behavioural problems: “Police don’t’ take enough action early enough” (p8, p12). “Need stronger police presence (p3, p8)”. During the lockout sometimes females get stuck outside without their friends and cannot get in” (p8, p2).

Concern was also expressed that environmental factors such as narrow footpaths, dark alley ways and long patron lines increased the risk of injury and aggressive outbursts among patrons: “footpaths too narrow….long lines into venue stretch onto roads….traffic passes too fast and close….pedestrians have been injured and killed” (p2). In addition, some participants felt that there were too many nightclubs densely located in a small geographical area that were in part responsible for creating crowding and violence on the streets: “Entertainment areas too congested with clubs and people. Not enough security personal at taxi ranks” (p12, p 3).

Another theme related to the dispensing of illicit drugs in and around nightclubs, particularly clubs owned by bikie groups. In addition, some participants believed that the security industry was not adequately regulated in that some of them
had employees who were associated with a criminal element: “Bikie groups who own licensed premises are a problem……illicit drugs are dispensed in some venues” (p5, p2, p6). “Police beat at Surfers Paradise moved from central highly visible area to less visible and centralised area” (9p13gg). “Security Services cannot meet demand…govt takes too long to process applications (re security officers positions)…..some security services associated with organised crime” (p7).

A number of participants suggested a variety of strategies that might improve public and patron safety. These included ensuring police beats were highly visible and that police presence was more regular and a need for more CCTVs: “More CCTVs, more police patrols and improved lighting” (p10, p15, p17). “Police need to do more walk bys and cruises” (p8). It was suggested that barriers should be erected along footpaths in order to prevent patrons spilling onto roadways and to protect them from passing traffic: “Traffic needs to be diverted from central entertainment area. Barriers on footpath would provide protection to patrons, prevent spillage onto roads. Speed limit should be lowered during late night trading hours” (p. 12, p17, p18). In addition, a need was expressed for trained crowd controllers around taxis lines and ranks. Furthermore, contravention of liquor licensing laws should be policed by a demerit point system and penalties allotted to varying demerit points: “Need a central hub for taxis and properly trained crowd controllers on ranks” (p7, p4). Reduce and cap number of licensed premises….too many nightclubs in a small area” (p9, p15). “Introduce a demerit point system for contravention…..when reach allotted points license to be suspended or lost” (p2,).

**Implementation Process Issues**

Responses from the participants indicated that there were differences in the implementation processes between the Gold Coast and Brisbane City/Fortitude
Valley. The lockout policy was introduced in the Gold Coast following a lengthy consultation process. In addition, the Gold Coast had been serviced by a well-coordinated Surfer Paradise Action Project since the middle of the 1990s and specialised police unit (LEAPS) that worked closely with other government agencies and licensees to enforce liquor licensing laws. The lockout policy was initially coordinated by the local council in the Gold Coast area and comments by participants in this area included: “Lockout and extension of the LEAPS and Surfers Paradise Safety Action Projects……..Introduced after long consultation process involving local businesses, licensees and community members. Lockout initially led and introduced by Gold Coast Council. Specialised dedicated well trained police unit that co-ordinates multi agency group to enforce and regulate liquor laws. Structured and systematic process of auditing nightclubs and enforcing laws based on intelligence led policing. Regular meetings between police and licensees…. Not all licensees attend” (p6, p14, p16).

In contrast, the lockout strategy in Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley was introduced in the context of media publicity and public concern about violence and disorder on the streets around licensed premises trading late. While there was some consultation, this appears to have been carried out in a rather hasty manner and some licensees and security firms believed they were excluded from the process. While it is acknowledged that that there were some alcohol safety action groups (eg., VAMP) in place, another theme to emerge was that participants indicated that meetings were irregular. In addition, police in the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley did not operate in a specialised way compared to the Gold Coast. The policy in regards to how incidents requiring attendance by police were dealt with also changed after the introduction of the lockout. It should also be noted that the majority, 23 of the 25 late-night trading
licensed premises on the Gold Coast are located in a small geographical area of Surfers Paradise. However, there are a greater number of licensed premises trading late in Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley (approximately 63) and these are spread over a much larger geographical area. Some of the participant’s responses included: “Most major security firms not contacted” (p7, p8, p9, p11, p18). “Some safety action groups such as VAMP already in place. Liaison group meetings between police and licensees exist but some complaints about lack of regular meeting and lack of attendance” (p11). “Audits by liquor licensing officers seem to occur regularly….at least once per month” (p11). “Recording of police incidents changed after the lockout was introduced. Prior to lockout it was not mandatory to record and follow up on all incidents, particularly if incidents were minor and made by an intoxicated person. After the lockout, there was a new incident reporting direction that required mandatory recording and follow up of all incidents” (p2, p20). “Police recruited from general operational police and not specialised. Some evidence that a few clubs contravened lockout by allowing patrons in ……at least one club was prosecuted” (p12).

Discussion

The present paper aimed to report on both the outcome and process impact of a lockout legislative provision on levels of alcohol-related offences in and around late-night trading licensed premises situated in Brisbane and on the Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia. The lockout policy involved preventing patrons from entering licensed premises between the hours of 3am until time of closing at 5am. Patrons were permitted to remain in the licensed premises consuming alcohol until the time of closing but those who chose to leave for any reason were not permitted to re-enter. Overall, the quantitative findings suggest that the lockout policy may have been
marginally effective for some kinds of offences in certain areas. The qualitative findings revealed benefits of the lockout policy that could not be demonstrated by a solely quantitative analysis and highlighted other strategies that could be utilised to improve patron safety.

**Impact of Lockout Policy on Alcohol-related Incidents**

The lockout policy seems to have resulted in some significant positive effects in the Gold Coast Police District, but the benefits were marginal at best in the Brisbane/Fortitude Valley. These differences may well be due to the implementation processes discussed below.

Alcohol-related incidents in the Gold Coast Police District were proportionally reduced after the introduction of the lockout policy for all time periods (across 24 hours). In addition, there were significantly fewer alcohol-related incidents during the critical time period of the lockout policy (3am-6am). A closer examination of the major category of offences across all time periods revealed that there was a reduction in alcohol-related disturbances/dispute by 6.2%, a reduction in alcohol-related street disturbances by 12.3% and a reduction in alcohol-related sexual offences by 33.7%. While downward trends were observed for the other three major categories of offences in the Gold Coast area there were no significant differences.

A further analysis of the major category of offences in the Gold Coast area in the three main time periods (12am-3am, 3am-6am & 6am-9am) during late-night liquor trading and just after close of trading was also undertaken. This analysis revealed that only a few of the offence categories experienced a decline at specific time periods. For example, after the introduction of the lockout policy disturbances/disputes involving alcohol declined by 19.2% during the 12am-3am time period. In addition, alcohol-related street disturbances and sexual offences
experienced a decline by approximately 18% and 29% respectively during all the other time periods, but not during the three main time periods of late-night liquor trading. Finally, alcohol-related traffic offences increased by 4.5% during all the other time periods but not during the three main time periods associated with late-night liquor trading.

In regards to the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley Police precincts, no significant variations were found for alcohol-related incidents across all the time periods following the introduction of the lockout. In addition, there were no significant differences for alcohol-related incidents between the 3am-6am time period after the introduction of the lockout legislative provision in Brisbane City or Fortitude Valley. A closer examination of the major category of offences across all the time periods revealed little variation for the majority of alcohol-related offences following the introduction of the lockout policy. Alcohol-related trauma in Fortitude Valley was the only offence category to experience a significant reduction by 30% after the lockout policy was introduced.

A further more detailed analysis of the data for the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley involving the three main time periods coinciding with liquor late-night trading revealed only a few significant variations. Alcohol-related traffic offences, was the only offence category in Brisbane City to experience a significant decline by 12.9% during the lockout period. There were a number of significant variations in Fortitude Valley but there were no reductions experienced during the 3am-6am (lockout period) time period after the introduction of the lockout. Alcohol-related street disturbances and personal trauma declined by 16% and 14.6% respectively during all the other time periods. While alcohol-related disturbances /disputes experienced a reduction by
29% between 12am-3am, these types of offences increased by 33.8% between 3am-6am after the introduction of the lockout policy.

The quantitative findings of this study share some similarities with previous research (d’ Abbs & Tongi, 2000: Edwards et al., 1994) that indicate reductions in licensed trading hours can have a positive impact in reducing levels of alcohol-related harms. In addition, this study highlights the complex nature and the difficulties associated with implementing a preventive policy to curb violence and disorder associated with the alcohol industry. For example, while this study demonstrated that the lockout produced some positive benefits such as reducing disturbances, sexual offences and traffic incidents in some locations, other major categories of offences (e.g., assaults) typically involving alcohol remained unaffected by the lockout policy.

The lockout policy, as a crime prevention strategy however, appears to have been more successful than the strategy of reducing liquor trading hours. For instance, the randomised controlled Australian study by Walker & Biles, (1997) found that reducing liquor trading hours had little impact on overall crime rates, but may have contributed to a decline in drink driving offences.

**Process Impact of the Lockout Policy**

In respect to the implementation processes related to the introduction of the lockout policy, there were some key differences between the Gold Coast Police District and Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley that might explain the somewhat contrasting results. For instance, the lockout was initially introduced by the local Council in the Gold Coast area following lengthy consultation process. The lockout policy was introduced by the State government in the Brisbane/Fortitude Valley area a year later following its perceived success on the Gold Coast. The consultation process appears to have been brief and some key stakeholders felt they were excluded from the consultation
process. In addition, the Gold Coast area had the advantage of a specialised police unit that worked closely with other government agencies to rigorously enforce liquor licensing laws referred to as the LEAPS program. The Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley did not have such a unit or program at the time the lockout was first initiated. The Surfer Paradise Action Project was established to encourage appropriate behaviour and safe alcohol beverage service and was a well coordinated project in the Gold Coast area. While some alcohol safety action groups did exist in the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley, these do not appear to have been as well coordinated as in the Gold Coast area.

It should also be noted that most of the late-night liquor trading premises in the Gold Coast Area are densely concentrated in two main streets in Surfers Paradise whereas in the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley there are a greater number of late-night liquor trading premises and they are spread out over a much larger geographical area. Another major factor that may have affected the outcome of the lockout policy related to a policy change in how police dealt with and recoded alcohol-related incidents in the Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley following the introduction of the lockout. Prior to the lockout it had been police practice not to record or follow up on minor complaints made by very intoxicated patrons, as it was almost impossible to verify the complaints and institute legal action. Following the lockout policy, all complaints were required to be recorded and followed up where practically possible.

In regards to the main advantages of the lockout policy, most licensees believed that patron numbers and income were largely unaffected by the lockout. Licensees were generally initially opposed to the introduction of the lockout due to fears about the possible negative impact on business. To counter the possible negative effect, licensees’ implemented strategies to encourage patrons to remain in their
licensed premise during the lockout time period. Additionally, most licensees denied that violence was a problem within their licensed premise. They indicated that most violence occurred on the street and some believed that the level of violence on the streets had been curbed by the lockout while others felt the lockout had no impact. However, police officers generally reported that it was much quieter on the streets during the lockout policy time period.

A main disadvantage appears to be related to the possibility that the lockout policy created two rush hours that impacted on overcrowding at entry points to licensed premises and long waiting lines for taxis. A related issue is the risk of patrons being hit by motor vehicles as entry waiting lines to licensed premises extend on to the roadway or very close to the roadway. In addition, there was some concern expressed that licensed premises without designated smoking areas were disadvantaged as when patrons left the premise for a smoke they could not return. It was also felt that the lockout discouraged aggressive patrons from leaving in order to calm down as they could not re-enter. Visitors from interstate and overseas were also disadvantaged as they came from areas with no lockout policy and were unaware of the lockout and consequently refused entry.

**Theoretical and Policy Implications**

The findings of this research program provide support for the value of place based theories of crime, particularly the crime pattern theory, which suggests targeted situational crime prevention strategies should be centred on time and place in order to reduce incidents of disorder and violence often associated with late night liquor trading venues. Intelligence led policing initiatives (and corresponding research) has highlighted the need to direct situational crime prevention strategies to specific places and times associated with the late night entertainment industry (Block & Block, 1995;
The quantitative and qualitative findings of the current research project suggest that regulatory control policies maybe enhanced through maintaining a high level of consultation with the community and key stakeholders to ensure ongoing support for the regulation. Additionally, policy makers should work closely with key alcohol industry partners to encourage cooperation, support and enforcement consistency across late night alcohol entertainment venues. The outcomes of this research also suggest that the lockout policy is only one regulatory control mechanism that should be combined with other safety measures such as reducing vehicular speed, constructing footpath barriers, improving public transport and enforcing responsible service of alcohol. A combination of multimodal environmental regulatory controls may serve to enhance the effectiveness of the lockout policy and may be a cost effective way to reduce the community burden of alcohol-related violence.

Limitations

Some methodological limitations associated with the program of research should be borne in mind when interpreting the findings. The data collected only included information provided by first response operational (i.e., general duties) police related to attendance at actual incidents. Other sections of the police service such as detectives, specialist groups, Random Breath Test Units and general duties police who were on rostered correspondence days were not included in the study. The study required officers to make a subjective decision as to whether alcohol was involved in a recorded incident. As a result, it is anticipated that some level of error (i.e., under or over reporting of alcohol) in the labelling of incident types may be evident despite the efforts to train officers with the data collection process. Due to the time differences
associated with implementing the lockout in the Gold Coast Police District and Brisbane City/Fortitude Valley Police precincts caution has to be excised in comparing these two data sets. Additionally, the authors were restricted by police policy and funding and thus were only able to examine data for brief periods before and after the introduction of the lockout policy.

Despite such limitations, the current study is the first major study to comprehensively analyse the impact of a lockout policy on levels of alcohol-related offences at both a quantitative and qualitative level. This research has gone beyond the traditional approach of focusing on brief categorical data sources to provide a better understanding of the process issues from the perspectives of key stakeholders involved. These issues have been argued to have a critical impact on the effectiveness of the lockout policy. In particular, the findings highlight the importance of implementation processes to successful outcomes and the manner in which local factors can either impede or facilitate the success of a crime prevention strategy. One implication of this is that police need to be adequately trained and resourced in order to respond effectively to the high frequency of incidents that involve alcohol.

**Conclusions**

In summary, the lockout policy seems to have had a positive impact for some types of alcohol-related offences mostly in the Gold Coast area. However, alcohol-related traffic offences did decline significantly in the Brisbane City following the introduction of the lockout policy. On a qualitative level, while the majority of licensees were initially opposed to the lockout policy some of the key benefits reported included: increased patron numbers; improved public safety; and limited impact on revenue. The lockout policy also provided a means by which to keep unruly and intoxicated patrons from entering licensed premises. These changes
cannot be attributed to any decline that may have occurred due to corresponding
trends in offence rates as offences remained relatively stable during the study period.
In addition, there was no evidence that alcohol-related offences were displaced to
other time periods due to the introduction of the lockout policy.

This program of research also highlighted the importance of key stakeholders
and community members working collaboratively to implement strategies to reduce
levels of violence and disorder associated with the late-night liquor trading industry.
Previous studies have identified this approach as being important to encouraging safe
levels of alcohol consumption and improving patron safety (see Doherty & Roche,
2003; Homel, et al., 1997; Maguire, Nettleton, Rix, & Raybould, 2003; Mesko, &
Lobnikar, 2004; Wallin, Norstrom, & Andreasson, 2003). In addition, the importance
of a thorough consultation process and a highly trained and dedicated police liquor
licensing unit appears to result in a more positive impact.

The study also identified that a number of other strategies need to be carefully
considered for maximum effectiveness of harm reduction. These include, reducing
speed limits and erecting footpath barriers during late-night liquor trading hours. The
issue of permitting a large number of nightclubs densely located to trade late requires
further examination. Finally, the lockout policy is only one alcohol-related regulatory
control crime prevention initiative that attempted to improve patron safety and thus it
should be implemented as part of a multiplicity of strategies to regulate the late-night
liquor trading industry. Future research should re-examine the lockout policy from a
controlled long term perspective after taking into consideration the qualitative
findings of this study. There is also a need to gather information from the patrons of
late night entertainment venues to gain their views of the impact of the lockout
policy.
References


of traffic offences and their relationship to other non traffic offences.

Proceedings of the Road Safety Research, Policing and Education

Conference, Wellington, New Zealand.


strategy to improve compliance with legislation: Queensland Alcohol and Drug Research and Education Centre (QADREC). Queensland Health and University of Queensland.


Table 1: Number of Incidents in and around Licensed Premises before and after Lockout Legislative Provision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Periods</th>
<th>Incident Type</th>
<th>Alcohol Related</th>
<th>Non Alcohol related</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 Hours</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before-no lockout</td>
<td>983 (26.0)</td>
<td>864 (34.4)</td>
<td>574 (36.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After-lockout</td>
<td>2031 (23.0)*</td>
<td>927 (35.0)</td>
<td>687 (38.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3am-6am)</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before-no lockout</td>
<td>149 (51.3)</td>
<td>211 (59.4)</td>
<td>72 (51.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After-lockout</td>
<td>215 (39.0)*</td>
<td>256 (60.2)</td>
<td>103 (56.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at the Alpha level 0.05. (Figures in brackets are percentages)
Table 2: Alcohol and non alcohol-related offences in and around Licensed Premises before and after Lockout Policy and across 24 hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>Gold Coast</th>
<th>Alcohol Related</th>
<th>Incident Type</th>
<th>Non Alcohol related</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gold Coast</td>
<td>Brisbane Valley</td>
<td>Gold Coast</td>
<td>Brisbane Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n  %</td>
<td>n  %</td>
<td>n  %</td>
<td>n  %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance/Dispute¹ Before</td>
<td>135(40.6)</td>
<td>98(60.5)</td>
<td>82(53.9)</td>
<td>197(59.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>240(34.4)</td>
<td>122(67.4)</td>
<td>97(62.2)</td>
<td>458(65.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street/Disturbance² Before</td>
<td>108(73.0)</td>
<td>94(55.0)</td>
<td>63(65.6)</td>
<td>40(27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>105(60.7)*</td>
<td>95(56.2)</td>
<td>84(56.0)</td>
<td>68(39.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Offences³ Before</td>
<td>13(56.5)</td>
<td>9(31.0)</td>
<td>5(50.0)</td>
<td>10(43.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>13(22.8)*</td>
<td>10(25.6)</td>
<td>11(50.0)</td>
<td>44(77.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic offences⁴ Before</td>
<td>261(37.0)</td>
<td>321(61.1)</td>
<td>109(54.8)</td>
<td>445(59.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>702(38.9)</td>
<td>363(60.8)</td>
<td>150(52.3)</td>
<td>1104(44.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assaults⁵ Before</td>
<td>45(48.4)</td>
<td>29(39.7)</td>
<td>25(52.1)</td>
<td>48(51.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>67(41.6)</td>
<td>40(52.6)</td>
<td>45(71.4)</td>
<td>94(58.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Trauma⁶ Before</td>
<td>18(19.6)</td>
<td>17(18.3)</td>
<td>31(42.5)</td>
<td>69(85.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>48(20.4)</td>
<td>10(11.0)</td>
<td>7(12.5)*</td>
<td>247(96.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at the Alpha level 0.05 (Figures in bracket are percentages) ¹A disturbance/dispute is defined as a breach of peace that occurs inside a licensed premise ²A street/disturbance (e.g., fighting, a nuisance, shouting) is an incident that occurs outside a licensed premise ³Includes rape, attempted rape, indecent assault, wilful exposure and indecent acts ⁴Includes all vehicle/traffic related incidents resulting in offences, as well as traffic incidents involving accidents and unlawful entry of motor vehicles. ⁵Includes common assaults and serious assaults against persons. ⁶Includes injuries and deaths caused by industrial/domestic accidents, suicide related incidents and incidents involving the mentally ill.
Table 3: Alcohol-related offences for the key three hour time periods and all other times on the Gold Coast before and after the lockout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offences</th>
<th>12am-3am</th>
<th>3am-6am</th>
<th>6am-9am</th>
<th>All Other Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute Disturbance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>39(76.5)</td>
<td>13(54.2)</td>
<td>5(20.8)</td>
<td>78(33.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>71(57.3)*</td>
<td>15(46.9)</td>
<td>7(22.6)</td>
<td>147(28.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Disturbance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>46(82.1)</td>
<td>26(83.9)</td>
<td>2(100.0)</td>
<td>36(61.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>59(60.1)</td>
<td>12(66.7)</td>
<td>1(100.7)</td>
<td>34(43.1)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>6(75.0)</td>
<td>2(66.7)</td>
<td>0(0.0)</td>
<td>5(45.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>2(40.0)</td>
<td>3(100.0)</td>
<td>1(16.7)</td>
<td>7(16.3)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>53(60.2)</td>
<td>25(64.1)</td>
<td>20(29.0)</td>
<td>63(32.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>123(57.5)</td>
<td>55(57.9)</td>
<td>40(23.3)</td>
<td>484(36.5)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assaults</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>15(75.0)</td>
<td>13(86.7)</td>
<td>0(0.0)</td>
<td>17(32.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>27(73.0)</td>
<td>3(75.0)</td>
<td>5(41.7)</td>
<td>32(29.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Trauma</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>2(25.0)</td>
<td>2(28.6)</td>
<td>1(20.0)</td>
<td>13(18.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>5(19.2)</td>
<td>4(33.3)</td>
<td>8(32.0)</td>
<td>31(18.0)</td>
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*Significant at alpha 0.05 level. Figures in brackets are percentages
Table 4: Alcohol-related offences for the key three hour time periods and all other time periods in Brisbane City and Fortitude Valley before and after the lockout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence Type</th>
<th>Brisbane City</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th>Fortitude Valley</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 am-3am</td>
<td>3am-6am</td>
<td>6am-9am</td>
<td>All Other Times</td>
<td>12am-3am</td>
<td>3am-6am</td>
<td>6am-9am</td>
<td>All Other Times</td>
</tr>
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<td>Dispute/Disturbance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>42(82.4)</td>
<td>11(73.3)</td>
<td>1(20.1)</td>
<td>44(48.4)</td>
<td>25(65.8)</td>
<td>8(42.1)</td>
<td>45(50.0)</td>
<td>45(51.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>57(73.1)</td>
<td>20(83.3)</td>
<td>4(66.7)</td>
<td>41(56.2)</td>
<td>7(36.8)*</td>
<td>22(75.9)*</td>
<td>2(50.0)</td>
<td>66(63.5)</td>
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<td>Street Disturbance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>43(71.7)</td>
<td>18(69.2)</td>
<td>5(35.7)</td>
<td>28(39.4)</td>
<td>17(68.0)</td>
<td>12(75.0)</td>
<td>2(40.0)</td>
<td>33(66.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>26(63.4)</td>
<td>40(63.5)</td>
<td>2(28.6)</td>
<td>27(46.6)</td>
<td>25(65.8)</td>
<td>17(63.0)</td>
<td>1(20.0)</td>
<td>40(50.0)*</td>
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<td>Sexual Offences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>5 (71.4)</td>
<td>6(85.7)</td>
<td>6(100.0%)</td>
<td>1(10.0)</td>
<td>2(100.0)</td>
<td>0(0.0)</td>
<td>3(100.0)</td>
<td>3(50.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>2(33.3)</td>
<td>3(50.0)</td>
<td>4(100.0%)</td>
<td>2(9.1)</td>
<td>3(75.0)</td>
<td>2(40.0)</td>
<td>3(100.0)</td>
<td>3(30.0)</td>
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<td>Traffic offences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>130(85.0)</td>
<td>60(88.2)</td>
<td>11(28.9%)</td>
<td>120(45.1)</td>
<td>33(76.7)</td>
<td>19(79.2)</td>
<td>3(25.0)</td>
<td>54(45.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>140(80.5)</td>
<td>67(75.3)*</td>
<td>17(45.9%)</td>
<td>139(46.8)</td>
<td>49(79.0)</td>
<td>17(70.8)</td>
<td>4(16.7)</td>
<td>80(45.2)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Assaults</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>12(57.1)</td>
<td>8(66.7)</td>
<td>0(0.0%)</td>
<td>9(24.3)</td>
<td>6(66.7)</td>
<td>5(50.0)</td>
<td>1(25.0)</td>
<td>13(52.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>15(68.2)</td>
<td>12(63.2)</td>
<td>1(50.0)</td>
<td>12(36.4)</td>
<td>15(93.8)</td>
<td>11(84.6)</td>
<td>1(100.0)</td>
<td>18(54.5)</td>
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<td>Personal Trauma</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>2(18.2)</td>
<td>3(37.5)</td>
<td>1(11.1%)</td>
<td>11(16.9)</td>
<td>7(50.0)</td>
<td>4(80.0)</td>
<td>5(50.0)</td>
<td>15(34.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>2(18.2)</td>
<td>0(0.0)</td>
<td>1(7.1%)</td>
<td>7(11.3)</td>
<td>0(0.0)</td>
<td>0(0.0)</td>
<td>1(14.3)</td>
<td>6(14.6)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at the alpha 0.05 level (figures in brackets are percentages)