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The six pillars foresight process – consisting of methods such as the Futures Triangle, Causal Layered Analysis, Integrated Scenario Planning and Backcasting – was used.

Key themes were: citizen contribution, social inclusion, green democracy, the digital citizen and democracy for all.

Four scenarios were developed: Asia awakens, Asia is green, the fresh floating market and Asia in decline.

Among the key strategies developed were: move toward human development; ally democracy with sustainability; enhance women's participation; create processes so that citizens are empowered, responsible, informed and that governance is inclusive, equal and participatory.

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## Visions and Scenarios of Democratic Governance in Asia 2030

### ABSTRACT

Using the Six Pillars foresight workshop process, forty-five Asian political, policy and activist leaders explored the futures of democratic governance. Organized and funded by Oxfam and the Rockefeller Foundation, the organizing hypothesis was that without a change in the nature of governance in Asia, poverty could not truly be uprooted. Changes in governance needed to be imagined and created from the ground up, not just imposed by the past or the elite. Five visions with accompanying causal layered analysis were developed by participants. Generally, these visions focused on more inclusion not just at the level of voting, but in terms of the participatory creation of alternative futures of culture, technology, economy and polity.

### KEYWORDS

Futures studies, causal layered analysis, scenario, visions, democracy, governance and Asia

### 1. Participatory knowledge

“Democratic governance will thrive in Asia, once Asian narratives – myths and metaphors – are used to provide support and give meaning to it.”

“Democratic governance in 2030 will be radically different from how we see it today. We need new lenses to see the future.”

“Democratic governance will keep on changing as new technologies, demographic shifts and geopolitical transitions challenge reality – prepare for flux!”

Organized by Oxfam, Chulalongkorn University (Thailand) and the Lew Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (Singapore), with support of the Rockefeller Foundation, these and other perspectives were suggested at a two-day forum in Bangkok, March 7-8, 2013 on Visions of Democratic Governance in Asia 2030. While there were certainly key influence makers from around Asia – a minister from Pakistan - leading civil society leaders and intellectuals from Thailand, Cambodia, India, Singapore, Philippines and elsewhere, the meeting in itself was not a typical conference highlighted by long speeches and Ministerial grandstanding. Rather it was an interactive workshop that used the methods and tools from the field of Futures Studies to explore visions of democracy in 2030 and pathways to realize that vision. While the process was highly structured – using the “Six Pillars foresight process” [1] consisting of methods and tools such as the futures triangle, integrated scenario planning, causal layered analysis and backcasting, the process was in itself democratic – participants worked and contributed to the futures they wished to see [2, 3]. Each table featured participants from diverse expertise and cultural backgrounds and a group facilitator. The overall process and the various futures tools were articulated and conducted by the lead facilitator, Author. The conference was organized by Janepich Cheva-Isarakul with assistance of Paht Tanattanwain

But why hold such a meeting?

1 In the past decades, Asia has experienced remarkable changes and two faces of Asia thus emerged:  
2 “richer, healthier, more educated, and living longer” and another where many still suffer from  
3 poverty, limited access to basic needs and human rights violations. Will these two faces converge  
4 creating a new integrated and balanced Asia or will they move in different directions leading to  
5 increased inequity, dictatorships and a loss of civil rights? As progressive global citizens, Asia  
6 Development Dialogue seeks best approaches to accelerate Asia’s achievement of the Millennium  
7 Development Goals (MDGs) and beyond. It is within this context that the organization searches for  
8 new visions and alternative futures to explore how Asia might develop to 2030 and advocates  
9 democratic governance as a key aspect of the post-2015 debate [4].  
10

11 But why focus on democratic governance?  
12

13  
14 Democratic governance is cross cutting, it links two different perspectives to the politics of the  
15 future – the idealist’s belief in “fair elections, accountable leaders, and democratic institutions as the  
16 core pillar of every society [4]” and the realist’s perspective that development is a sequence and  
17 “state-building is a vital first step for the state to provide welfare and security to its citizens [4].” As  
18 current reality is polarized between these two positions, by moving to the future, to 2030, it was  
19 hoped that alternative futures where there could be both strong governance and strong democracy  
20 could emerge, as well as a discussion of scenarios if an integration did not emerge. Thus, the future  
21 became a vehicle to begin to imagine visions of Asia where the two faces of Asia could integrate.  
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## 24 **2. Conceptual framework and methodology**

25  
26 To ensure the debate on the futures of Asia was robust, the “Six Pillars” conceptual framework was  
27 used to elicit visions and recommendations. These tools are structured to help participants question,  
28 map, anticipate, deepen, create alternatives to, and transform the futures that they envisioned [5].  
29 For each pillar there is an accompanying method or tool. The first pillar, mapping, uses the futures  
30 triangle to map the future. The futures triangle has three vertices: the image or the pull of the  
31 future, the quantitative drivers or the push of the future and the qualitative weights of the past. The  
32 second pillar, anticipating, attempts to challenge or disturb the image of the future using emerging  
33 issues analysis. These issues, for example, real time digital democracy in Asian cities by 2030, are  
34 then explored in terms of their first and second order implications through the futures wheel. The  
35 map of the future is thus made more robust. Timing the future, the third pillar, explores the  
36 structural patterns of history, particularly cyclical, linear, pendulum and spiral models of social  
37 change. Macrohistorical structure is thus used to bring insight to the foresight process, for example,  
38 will there be a pendulum swing back to face-to-face community modes of democracy by 2030?  
39 Deepening the future, the fourth pillar, unpacks images of the future and issues through the causal  
40 layered analysis process. Core metaphors are debated and new stories emerge; the future is  
41 deconstructed and reconstructed. The fifth pillar, creating alternatives, uses scenario planning to  
42 develop alternative futures, to ask what is missing, to search for outliers, for example, a demagogue  
43 using digital technologies to reduce democracy and corrupt governance by 2030. Finally, the sixth  
44 pillar, transforming the future, focuses on creating texture to the vision of the future; seeing the  
45 vision not as a goal but as present, as real. From this reality, the process of backcasting articulates  
46 strategic processes and projects that need to be initiated to realize the preferred future.  
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53 Participants began the meeting with discussion on the utility of the foresight model. Case studies  
54 from other meetings were presented. This led to buy-in. Those sceptical of the futures approach,  
55 given the reality of power politics, were willing to suspend their doubts for the two days, that is, to  
56 try the methods and learn from each other. Indeed, the entire process was constructed as a learning  
57 journey, to explore their hidden assumptions about the future, to work together to create scenarios  
58 and visions. Following this, they broke up into small groups and developed a core research question;  
59  
60

1 for example, the role of climate change and governance or poverty and democracy. They then went  
2 through a questioning process explained below. From here, participants worked through the logic of  
3 the six pillars process. The challenge for facilitators was ensuring that everyone had a chance to  
4 speak, that every voice was heard, not just the loudest or the most eloquent. There was a  
5 perceivable excitement in the room as participants had rarely the chance to leave their focus on the  
6 politics of the present and move to the possibilities of the future.

7  
8 While the entire methods and tools were used, in this report we do not present on, emerging  
9 issues/weak signals [6] that might assist or obstruct the development of democratic governance by  
10 2030 or the futures triangle and the futures wheel. In addition, it is noteworthy that the traditional  
11 double variable uncertainty model of scenario planning was not utilized as the goal of the meeting  
12 was not to develop particular organizational strategies but to explore alternative futures and  
13 challenge core assumptions as to why individuals believe certain futures would arise. The double  
14 variable method is weak at creating deeper alternatives since the future results from the two  
15 foundational variables. This is especially so in multilateral settings where notions of uncertainty are  
16 not shared amongst participants. Developing visions and alternative futures of democratic  
17 governance for Asia was the primary goal of the meeting [7]. Most relevant to the report are two  
18 tools: (1) causal layered analysis [8] and (2) integrated scenario planning [7].

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21  
22 Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) is a theory of knowledge and methodology that helps transform the  
23 future by reframing the problem/issue through deeper causative levels and by constructing the  
24 issues through diverse worldviews and stakeholders. This allows the creation of more robust policy  
25 solutions, which integrate the perspectives of different stakeholders. CLA enhances the richness of  
26 the discussion allowing for a transformation of strategy, from the official or current reality to reality  
27 considered from other perspectives (deconstruction) and then to the reconstructed or integrative  
28 view.

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30  
31 The four levels, or layers, of CLA are: litany, system, worldview, and myth/metaphor. At the litany  
32 level the real consists of seldom-challenged naturalized day-to-day practices. The litany often comes  
33 in the form of newspaper headlines, propaganda, exaggeration of problems and uncontested data.  
34 The system level analyses causes for the issue or phenomenon from social, technological, economic,  
35 ecological, political, legal, or ethical perspectives. The worldview level considers the deeper  
36 assumptions behind the issue; what normalizes and legitimates those views. At the root level is myth  
37 or metaphor: where unconscious beliefs, collective (historically constructed) archetypes, and deep  
38 stories are uncovered.

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42 The four layers lay one on top of another, from the most superficial to the deepest. Solutions at all  
43 levels are important, though those responding to the deeper levels will cause deeper changes.  
44 Responses or policies derived from the litany level are the easiest to come up with and to implement,  
45 but often carry results that are more short-term oriented. Those developed at the systemic level are  
46 most commonly seen in policies or research projects conducted by experts or analysts; much ground  
47 seems to be covered, but without contesting the paradigms these solutions tend to reinforce the  
48 prevailing paradigm. Though more difficult, analysis at the levels of worldview and myth unpacks the  
49 past and the present. Solutions derived from these levels, as a consequence, carry more powerful  
50 impacts and deeper potential for transformation.

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54 Along with depth, participants explored breadth. They challenged the current reality (or preferred  
55 future) with an alternative future (from another perspective or perspectives) and then developed a  
56 third space, by integrating these two or more perspectives.

1 Scenario planning is used to help participants from the “one future” or planning for “the” future to  
2 the acceptance of other possible and preferred futures. Scenario planning helps create alternative  
3 futures by challenging the business-as-usual present. It distances from the present.

4 Through a comprehensive description of a future from multiple dimensions, scenario analysis helps  
5 in gaining perspectives on the issue, to create alternative futures, and to identify drivers and risks in  
6 different future scenarios, and, ultimately, to reduce risk by considering alternatives.  
7

8  
9 For the forum, the “integrated scenario technique” was used wherein participants are first asked to  
10 develop a preferred future. From the preferred, a disowned future is articulated. The disowned is  
11 that which the preferred is unable to account for, often the dialectical opposite. These preferred and  
12 the disowned are integrated, allowing for enhanced robustness and plausibility. Finally to deal with  
13 the unknown, an outlier scenario is articulated. Within each scenario, along with details on the  
14 headline, the systemic characteristics, the dominant worldview and the core metaphor, group  
15 members described a day in the life of someone in that future. This was done to personalize the  
16 future, to not see in terms of official power, but to see the future as lived.  
17  
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19  
20 As the workshop purpose was focused on creating visions of a democratic Asia, in the end, most  
21 groups chose to focus and portray their preferred future scenario, though groups did develop  
22 outliers, and one selected to focus on that.  
23

### 24 3. Questioning the future

25  
26 A questioning process – that mirrors the logic of the six pillars – challenged core assumptions and  
27 paradigms on the first day made it easier to imagine alternative futures on the second [9]. After  
28 identifying each group’s research area focus (futures of governance, futures of inclusion, measuring  
29 democracy, for example), the following seven questions were posed. These were:  
30

- 31 (1) The history of the issue;
- 32 (2) Their forecasts if current trends continued. This question was asked so that participants  
33 could not only bring their forecasts to the table and openly discuss them, but as well to get  
34 the official future out of the way;
- 35 (3) The critical assumptions they used in their forecast;
- 36 (4) Alternative futures based on different assumptions;
- 37 (5) Their preferred future;
- 38 (6) Their strategies to realize the preferred future; and,
- 39 (7) A new narrative or metaphor that would support their preferred future. This last question  
40 was asked as it was suggested if there was no underlying narrative that could support the  
41 desired future, then it was unlikely that the desired future could be realized, since story or  
42 worldview would not permit it.  
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47 These questions opened up the future, participants debated issues and assumptions. Some meta  
48 questions that emerged from this group process included: has the era of the big man ended in Asian  
49 democracies? Would crowdsourcing or peer-to-peer democracy work in the Asian context [10]?  
50 Would new digital technologies help or hurt democracy? Would there be an Asian Spring? Once  
51 economic needs are truly met in Asia, would collectivism reduce in import and individualism rise?  
52  
53

54 With the future opened, participants could create alternative futures. Among the futures that  
55 emerged from challenging assumptions were: (1) A green Asia; (2) An Asia with direct democracy  
56 through digital technologies (apps and bots); (3) An Asia in economic decline because of ageing and  
57 generational battles between an ageing population holding on to power and a youth vying for  
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59

1 political legitimacy; (4) A post-capitalist Asia where cooperatives become the norm; and (5) an Asian  
2 Union [11].

3 From a discussion of alternatives, participants sketched out their preferred futures. It was this  
4 preferred future that was then used to develop the visions of the future. The preferred future was  
5 placed in the strategic discourse through the futures triangle. Drivers enabling the preferred future  
6 and weights or barriers preventing its realization were then mapped. Metaphors and narratives that  
7 could support the preferred future were then explored.  
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#### 10 **4. Five visions**

11 After extensive deliberation, five visions of the future emerged. Each group presented their vision to  
12 others for questioning, clarification and further development. This next part of the report presents  
13 these visions in some detail.  
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15  
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##### 17 *4.1 Vision one: CIE – contribution, inclusion and empowerment*

18 The first was titled, Contribution, Inclusion and Empowerment. By this they meant that citizens  
19 needed to contribute to governance, everyone needed to be included, and in doing so  
20 empowerment would emerge. But this was not empowerment, i.e. power over others; rather, it was  
21 empowerment that contributed to the welfare of everyone. The core metaphor for this group was  
22 the Ant - a small but powerful creature that understands that empowerment is not a given but is  
23 created by working together. Ants work as a cohesive unit and are able to achieve more than they  
24 are as individuals. Understanding that any true democracy requires participation, this group rallied  
25 around the ideas of bringing more people to the forefront of democratic governance and giving  
26 those citizens a meaningful way to participate. This was a vision of less bureaucracy and more  
27 participatory governance: government as facilitator and guide rather than government as teacher or  
28 parent. Using CLA, this group deconstructed the current reality of Asian democratic governance and  
29 created a reconstructed, plausible future.  
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37 [Insert Table 1 here]  
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41 To this group, the current reality of governance is that of the “the God King,” where the majority of  
42 people have few ways to make their own lives meaningful and satisfactory while also being obliged  
43 to work for the over-privileged to survive. These adverse conditions eventually will force people to  
44 change their mindset. Then the preferred future of the citizens emerged. In this future, the  
45 metaphor is “the ants”; everyone collaborates efficiently. In their concluding analysis, the core  
46 metaphor of the plausible future was the boat at the edge of a cliff. They selected this as people in  
47 Asia are like passengers on the boat. If business-as-usual continues, the boat falls off the cliff and  
48 everyone dies. It is only when that people collectively agree to move to the other side of the boat, i.e.  
49 become more collaborative and efficient, to avoid catastrophes. Real choices needed to be made,  
50 and could be made.  
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##### 54 *4.2 Vision two: social inclusion as the key indicator*

55 The second group took inclusion even more seriously. They argued that for better democratic  
56 governance by 2030, a set of indicators would need to focus on social inclusion. Indices that would  
57 measure how nations and/or cities include their voices and perspectives of their citizens need to be  
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1 created. These indices would also offer awards to those who demonstrated institutional practices  
2 that enhanced inclusion. The core metaphor of this future is “Bees.” Government works like a queen  
3 bee to facilitate the growth of the wider society. Females reproduce and cultivate the honey; males  
4 contribute to reproduction. To make the case for enhanced inclusion, the group argued that the  
5 current lack of inclusion in politics could lead to a future wherein a charismatic leader with extremist  
6 (religious) viewpoints would rally the masses, gaining the allegiance as they for far too long have felt  
7 excluded and marginalized.

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9 The CLA analysis is as follows:

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12 [Insert Table 2 here]  
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16 Their main argument was that Asia should no longer abide by the social Darwinian notion of the  
17 survival of the fittest. While growth and development are still valued, their essence is completely  
18 redefined. Inclusiveness measures are incorporated into economic indicators.  
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#### 21 *4.3 Vision three: green democracy*

22

23 The third group agreed with inclusion, but argued that the environment was foundational. They  
24 asserted that democratic governance was impossible if nature was not part of, and ultimately built  
25 into society. This meant nature at every level – green design for cities, green design for buildings,  
26 indeed, nature could not be an externality, but had to be internalized and accounted for [12]. Green  
27 democracy was their vision of the future. They imagined Green political parties rising up throughout  
28 Asia. This was logical as Asian development had, while creating a middle class, been “cement” heavy  
29 and nature had been pushed away. As more and more research has demonstrated that productivity  
30 is enhanced in green buildings [13], and the immune system of individuals is strengthened when the  
31 forest enters the city, democratic governance in 2030 rests on the platform of green politics –  
32 gender equity, nature inclusion, smart design, and deep diversity. Their metaphor for the future was  
33 a healthy body – the body politic was smart and green, using the best from science to create a  
34 healthy environment so Asians could enjoy the gains from sound economic development.  
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37  
38 Using CLA, the group articulated their preferred reality (the healthy body), then unpacked the likely  
39 future if current trends continued (the hyper body). They concluded with a reconstructed view of  
40 the future from the perspective of citizens (the smart body).  
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43  
44 [Insert Table 3 here]  
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48 The hyper body metaphor depicts capitalism as we know today, with its emphasis on growth and  
49 consumption at the cost of nature and human wellbeing. Energy-boosting pills have to be  
50 continuously pumped into the system in order to make the body more productive and longer-lasting.  
51 It might appear to work from the outside but ultimately causes harm to the system by disrespecting  
52 the true needs of the body (i.e. by belittling the working poor and exploiting nature). A healthy body,  
53 on the other hand, uses health as the only life goal disregarding other goals. It would change the  
54 current urban lifestyle in order to achieve optimum health. Companies, for instance, reward  
55 employees on the basis of their exercise volume or for the consumption of nutritious organic food.  
56 The body might be in good shape as a consequence, but other aspects of the body might suffer. A  
57 smart body integrates and marries sustainability to a capitalist system to make the latter work for  
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the former [14]. One does not have to be over-conscientious on health issues; by simply living in a smart and balanced way, health comes naturally as the new form of “progress” because the mechanisms are already in place to make the system work.

### 3.4 Vision four: the digital citizen

The fourth group agreed with the others but added the power of the digital citizen. By 2030 dramatic new interactive evaluative Big Data technologies [15] would be embedded in everything citizens did. While certainly this challenges our current notions of privacy, by 2030 with digital natives [16] as the dominant demographic category, everyone is a “friend”. Politics is daily, immediate and interactive. There are new public spaces where engagement occurs. Ratemymayor.com and many other applications would be the norm, many of them predictive, solving problems of sanitation, safety and security before they become big issues. Citizens play a direct role in the polity, indeed, they are the polity. Politicians are seen far less as daily legislators but instead as last resort custodians of decisions, most of the time they work with citizens to facilitate desired futures. The metaphor for this future was the co-scripted text. Democracy is not a book authored by others, rather, is it written daily in the actions and choices – the “likes” of citizens.

The metaphor for this future is “participatory scriptwriting.” Democratic governance is like participatory, crowd-sourced writing. Citizens are script-writers and all have an integral part to play. Everyone owns the future. Each is involved and has a responsibility to make the script/movie work and be enjoyable. The director is not the leader; everyone has a part in decision-making and implementation of the “story.” Democratic governance, just like writing a script for a film, is a process. The CLA in-cast of democratic governance for this group is deconstructed from three perspectives: elite, poor child, and activist points of view. Both the elite and the poor views reflect the business-as-usual reality, while the activist view is preferred.

[Insert Table 4 here]

Of relevance here is the argument that the future should not belong only to the elites, who traditionally own the power to frame the world according to their perspectives and expect or force everyone else to follow, in a sense building brick walls. Within the walls, the underprivileged cannot see the future, nor do they have the power to break free. The walls should be removed and the world returned to everyone who had been living inside them.

### 3.5 Vision five: fresh floating market

To create any of these visions, a narrative platform is required. This group offered the Asian marketplace, the fresh market, as the guiding story. In this market, buyers and sellers interact daily; their choices creating the political-economy. No one group dominates; this is not an oligarchy or a corporatist monopoly. Rather, citizens own the future. Democracy is owned by all: and thus loved by all. Democracy thus is engaged, participative inclusive and creates results that benefit the market as whole and the citizens who live in the market.

The metaphor for the preferred future is “the floating fresh food market.” Though seemingly unstable, the floating market is actually more likely to withstand the storm. The imagery of the floating market is egalitarian and Asian. The success of the floating market depends on decentralized

1 governance and inclusiveness. Everyone has ownership. It is not corporate or a monopoly; it is a  
2 people-owned market. Equal opportunity shareholding engages all venders in shaping the market.

3  
4 Equal participation is highly valued, and so is profit-sharing by equal-opportunity venders. The  
5 society accommodates diversity just as all goods can be sold in the market. Democracy comes in all  
6 sorts of forms; many countries went through “homegrown” democratic/governance change.  
7 Accountability is ensured with the help of democratizing technologies, like the internet, which keep  
8 the citizens informed and connected.  
9

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11 [Insert Table 5 here]  
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15 In the current reality analysed by the group, there is a clear line between the elites, who are  
16 assumed to “know best,” and the general public, who are powerless and “ignorant.” The former,  
17 therefore, are seen as being entitled to set guidelines for the latter. This group wants to create  
18 another kind of platform with a different selection system and a different basis for its legitimacy.  
19 Leaders/governors have to earn their positions through trust and accountability instead of through  
20 inheritance. They do so by interacting daily with venders and shoppers in the market, who are the  
21 new source of legitimacy. There are multiple spaces for power and a variety of selection processes.  
22 Governance is transparent and accountable, which is guaranteed by effective organizational and  
23 individual watchdog systems.  
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#### 27 **4. Drivers and risks**

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29 To realize these visions, changes clearly have to occur. However, participants argued that the visions  
30 were possible because of demographic, technological, democratic, environmental and economic  
31 drivers [17]. They articulated these drivers in using the futures triangle methodology, wherein after  
32 selection of a particular preferred future, corresponding drivers (the pushes of the present) and  
33 weights (the weights of history) were debated. The drivers were: (1) A generational shift from the  
34 independence generation to the digital natives, who expect far more embedded technologies and  
35 inclusion; (2) Digital, 3d printing, holograms, Big Data technologies that can make democracy as a  
36 daily practice far more real; (3) The move from vertical sociality organized by seniority to more peer-  
37 to-peer organizations where the capacity to share information, to be hubs in the node, to cooperate  
38 and work together – and this can be slow – is creating a new narrative that leads to more  
39 productivity. This does not mean the end of hierarchy but situational hierarchy, where in times of  
40 emergency; tough decisions do need to be made by leadership to ensure the long term over the  
41 short term and all groups instead of the few or the individual; (4) Climate change leading to crisis  
42 throughout Asia – 32 trillion dollars of assets are at risk, most of that in large Asian cities – forcing  
43 innovation to meet these challenges [18]. While there is a scenario where crisis enforce the “big man”  
44 metaphor, there is also the possibility that innovation is social, leading to a future where the actions  
45 of each individual enhances the ability to meet this mega challenge; and (5). As Asia becomes  
46 wealthier and basic needs are met, the needs of freedom, the desire to enhance agency, to influence  
47 the future, will become more pronounced. This means more economic democracy – cooperatives –  
48 but also political democracy. While phase one means regular fair and transparent elections in  
49 nations, citizens and organizations; phase two means direct democracy using new digital  
50 technologies. Direct democracy by 2030 may not be relevant to every issue, but there may be many  
51 issues where citizens can either offer consultative advice, legislative advice, or indeed, executive  
52 advice.  
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1 The biggest challenge to the preferred visions of democratic governance probably comes from the  
 2 resistance of vested interests: elite capture, money politics, corporate interests, politicians and  
 3 bureaucrats, state capitalism, oligarch power, etc. Corruption or poor governance in the system  
 4 might risk democracy further; as could unregulated corporate or industrial competition. ICTs, too,  
 5 might be used to suppress personal freedom.

6  
 7 Some traditional cultural and social norms might defer the development of democratic governance:  
 8 hierarchy, patriarchy, exclusivist visions of identity, such as ultra-nationalism or fundamentalism,  
 9 religious beliefs, other forms of discrimination, etc.

10  
 11 The rise of the middle class could also pose threats through apathy or, simply, fear of change.  
 12 Another risk comes from the scarcity of natural resources, which may cause fierce competition and  
 13 therefore contribute to an unwillingness to democratize.

14  
 15 Participants identified three elements which were both drivers and risks: (1) technology; (2) the rise  
 16 of the middle class; and (3) environmental degradation. In the case of technology, participants  
 17 argued that for democratic governance, ICTs represented both possibilities and threats. For many  
 18 participants, the increasing size of the middle class and its influence on democratic governance was  
 19 indisputable. The collective attitude of this rising middle class will perhaps have a decisive impact on  
 20 the direction of development. Similarly, many groups considered environmental collapse to be a  
 21 possible source of inspiration for people to finally reframe their paradigm and work towards a better  
 22 future. Such a collapse, though, could also bring out the worst in human nature and lead to a  
 23 dystopia of selfish individualism.

## 24 25 26 27 28 **5. Themes and strategies**

29  
 30 Many significant themes cut across the five visions proposed by the groups. Major changes in  
 31 paradigm are strongly called for—from survival of the fittest to survival for all; from economy- and  
 32 elite-dominance to balanced sustainability; from male supremacy to equal female participation. The  
 33 ideal characteristics of democratic governance common to the five visions are inclusiveness,  
 34 participation and equality. In the preferred futures, citizens have active roles and are empowered,  
 35 responsible, and informed. The role of the government also changes from patriarchal to  
 36 networking—supportive, neutral, and decentralized. In the meantime, several paths are identified to  
 37 ensure this kind of democratic governance: new metrics to measure the newly-defined progress in  
 38 the new paradigm, utilization of digital technology for accessibility enhancement and empowerment,  
 39 and transparent and accountable governments. Finally, democratic governance in an Asian context  
 40 was also discussed widely.

### 41 42 43 44 45 *5.1 Need for major changes in paradigm*

46  
 47 Directly and indirectly, the demands for a new paradigm different from the current one cut across all  
 48 five groups. Participants argued that we need to shift from an obsession with growth to a desire for  
 49 balance, from the interests of elites to the interests of all, from economic development to human  
 50 development, from Darwinism to anti-Darwinism. Whether it was in transforming the current  
 51 practices of capitalism, to have it work for sustainability, or in completely abandoning it, this failing  
 52 system, and its supporting paradigm, was under siege in all five visions.

## 5.2 Sustainability

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2  
3 Strong urges to ally democracy and sustainability are also to be heard throughout. The failing system  
4 of capitalism is criticized and many forms of variation to transform capitalism are proposed. Under  
5 the current system, high economic development leads to wider gaps between the rich and the poor.  
6 It also represents disconnected relations between urban and rural and between humanity and the  
7 environment. It causes ruinous conditions for nature and for underprivileged people. Eventually  
8 everyone will be under the spell, as no one escapes from global food shortages or energy crises, for  
9 instance. A sustainable lifestyle—living not at the expenses of but with nature and other human  
10 beings—should become the new norm. Using a whole new set of criteria to measure national and  
11 personal success is the key. Once this is done, new political and economic systems that provide  
12 incentives to ensure sustainability will be in place.  
13  
14

15  
16 Another way of crying out for the eviction of the current industrialist system was “heard” more  
17 subtly. In the scenarios pictured by participants, the integrity to be human again was consistently  
18 called for—desires to be with loved ones, to have flexibility in life and work, to be able to take care  
19 of one’s body, to be happy, etc. These are reactions against the prevailing factory-like, production-  
20 oriented lifestyle. Rights to clean water and toxin-free food should take precedence over the needs  
21 of economic development. The desire to strike a balance between work and family/personal life  
22 should outpace the corporate practice of putting people in cubicles and punching time clocks in the  
23 name of productivity. In the preferred kind of democratic governance, citizens are contributors.  
24 What they contribute, however, should not be measured merely in economic terms.  
25  
26

## 5.3 Women’s Participation

27  
28  
29 Women’s empowerment in Asia was highly anticipated at the forum. The strengthening voice of  
30 women is highly valued, appreciated, and it is hoped that it will change the status quo, under which  
31 many of the disadvantaged are not taken care of. Women’s leadership in many areas is regarded to  
32 be able to create larger impacts and more human-oriented decisions on all sorts of issues.  
33  
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36

## 5.4 Governance: *inclusive, equal, participatory*

37  
38  
39 Several across-the-board descriptions of the desirable features of democratic governance appeared.  
40 These were: (a) inclusiveness: inclusion of all—not just the rich and powerful. Women, minorities,  
41 the needy, the voiceless, and the underprivileged should all have a say; (b) equality: designed to  
42 enhance equality for all and, again, not just for those whose voices are already heard. The current  
43 gap in democracies between the haves and have-nots needs to be addressed. Satisfactory living  
44 conditions, in terms of food, healthy, security, etc., for all, regardless of wealth, gender, nationality,  
45 or race/ethnicity should be the standard. Finally, (c) participation: the world should be a place that  
46 everyone can take part in, not just the capable. On the other hand, in order to participate  
47 responsibly, citizens need to be informed and engaged. Citizens are not just voters but contributors.  
48  
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## 5.5 Citizens: *empowered, responsible, informed*

51  
52  
53 In all five visions, citizens are not simply passive recipients of the benefits of democratic governance,  
54 they are expected to be active, responsible, free and contributing participants of the process. In  
55 order to be so, citizens need to be well-informed, empowered, and willing to participate.  
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60

1 People in all countries should be empowered to participate in democratic governance; citizens need  
2 to be aware of their rights, be educated and informed of what true democracy is, as well as of the  
3 critical issues that concern them. Everyone needs knowledge to be active. Empowered and active  
4 citizens are the best weapons against undesirable social practices, such as corruption. Participants at  
5 the forum reiterated that the role of education, democratized technology, and the media, in  
6 informing (and empowering) citizens should not be underestimated. In addition, citizens should not  
7 just participate, but take responsibility as well. Each person should be held accountable for his or her  
8 part in political or other decisions.  
9

#### 10 *5.6 Changing role of government: supportive, neutral, decentralized*

11 The current practice of governmental systems at the national level was widely challenged and  
12 various forms of transformations to achieve better democratic governance were proposed. In most  
13 of the preferred futures, the participants imagined a world where governments were neutral,  
14 decentralized/local, or even global. The rationale for suggesting neutral governments was to remove  
15 the possible dominance of interest groups in politics, which would subsequently extend to other  
16 aspects of the society. The main idea is to downgrade the roles of government until its stance on  
17 particular issues is neutral; government would then simply act as a facilitator or information/service  
18 provider. In other words, there would be a sense of structure, but no figure heads.  
19

20 In the decentralized/localized governance model, control is in everyone's hands, not in the hands of  
21 a strong man or men. The participants believed that citizen-driven accountability is more efficient,  
22 more responsive, and more proactive governance. Local communities, after all, know themselves  
23 best. In this vision, government also remains neutral and provides assistance, though it does  
24 promote local-level governance.  
25

26 Another core idea was to reorganize the boundaries of governments to expand regulation to the  
27 regional and global levels. One global government could be given power to deal with issues that  
28 needed close cooperation. The idea of an ASEAN community was discussed. So was the possibility of  
29 one community of the whole of Asia. The EU was used as an example. If it worked well, the world  
30 might even merge into one community.  
31

32 In another variation, it was even thought that cities might continue to grow, becoming megacities  
33 and eventually joining together politically to form alliances, leaving the traditional nation- state  
34 behind.  
35

#### 36 *5.7 Needs for new norms/standards*

37 Going along with the new paradigm, new norms and standards ought to take root to ensure  
38 advancement towards the preferred future. After all, democracy is hard work and needs systemic  
39 support to make it happen. Redefining indicators for measuring success is one of the keys to  
40 establishing systemic support.  
41

42 The reward and penalty systems in every aspect of society need to be aligned with society's new  
43 values. The use of soft indicators to measure potential/real human development is essential; though  
44 it is recognized that soft indicators are harder to measure and to reach consensus on. This, however,  
45 should not be a reason to go down the old road, to use the metrics that have led us in the wrong  
46 direction in the past. The values of capitalism and the industrial era—efficiency, productivity, growth,  
47 development, etc.—should be re-examined.  
48

1 Among the suggested indicators, happiness, through a “Happiness Index” or “GNH”, stands out. Such  
 2 indicators should have much more weight than indices of economic development, as growth, of  
 3 itself, has not made the world better or people happier [19].  
 4

5  
 6 Other suggested indicators for policies include: measures of the inclusion of social, cultural, and  
 7 environmental matters in decision-making; rewards linked to pro-green practices at the personal or  
 8 national level; greener infrastructure; better management of public resources; people-oriented  
 9 policies and programs; peaceful, sharing, and caring communities.  
 10

### 11 *5.8 Utilization of digital technology*

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 13  
 14  
 15 Technology is a double-edged knife for democratic governance in 2030—an essential tool that needs  
 16 to be handled with caution. It could provide an opportunity to widen participation in a way that was  
 17 never imagined before in human history, but it could also easily cut the other way and become a tool  
 18 of suppression for “big brother”.  
 19

20  
 21 Digital technology, particularly the internet, is anticipated to assist the development of democratic  
 22 governance in a variety of ways: (a) to increase information circulation that is necessary for an  
 23 informed and empowered citizenry: if knowledge is power, access to knowledge and information  
 24 becomes the key to equitable outcomes; technology will help to democratize this process. (b) To  
 25 lower the barriers for participation: geographic distance, physical disability, or work/other  
 26 obligations will be less restrictive on participation than they are now. (c) To enhance wider, even  
 27 global connectivity: more and easier channels to spread democratic ideas will be available to raise  
 28 civil awareness, and to provide civic education. (d) To support global involvement in local issues:  
 29 citizens in one country will be knowledgeable and have opinions on circumstances in other places. (e)  
 30 To encourage effective communication between citizens and the government: it is a crucial tool for  
 31 governments to serve citizens by providing public services instantly. Fast and responsive information  
 32 sharing can also make governments more accountable.  
 33  
 34  
 35

36  
 37 Of course, it is possible that the role of technology in the new wave of change has been over-  
 38 romanticized. It is also debateable how this level of near-universal popular access can be reached by  
 39 2030 and who will pay for it. Furthermore, the risk that technology could be abused to create  
 40 dystopian, “big brother” states was recognized by participants.  
 41

42  
 43 All in all, information and communication technologies (ICT) is expected to change the appearance of  
 44 public space, with the physical shrinking and the virtual expanding; newspapers die out and online  
 45 talks take over; the sense of community in a physical sense might be lost and face-to-face  
 46 interactions decreased. Re-appropriation of old government spaces for public use might become  
 47 necessary. Technology might also slow down the global rate of urbanization or even start the  
 48 process of de-urbanization.  
 49

### 50 *5.9 Preferred government: transparent, accountable*

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 52  
 53  
 54 In order for democratic governance to work as envisioned by the participants, several desirable  
 55 attributes of government needs to be put in place. Establishing mechanisms to maximize  
 56 transparency and accountability is regarded as a prerequisite for free and egalitarian governance.  
 57 Anyone holding some kind of power—whether in the public or private sector—needs to be held  
 58 accountable.  
 59

1 Whether the media could play the role of watchdog to ensure transparency and accountability in  
2 governance was in question. Though the media has a wide presence in countries all over Asia, where  
3 tight controls are in place, its role is still miniscule. In some other countries, the media is free and  
4 open but jam-packed with commercial influences. For a preferred future of democratic governance,  
5 the function and importance of the media need to be address.  
6

### 7 8 *5.10 The Asian context* 9

10  
11 As important for the development of democratic governance is the Asian context; there is, after all,  
12 no such thing as the perfect practice or form of democracy. Democracy is not a static target that we  
13 can reach; it is dynamic and organic. An answer to the question of how to adopt the level of  
14 democracy practiced in Europe and the US in the Asian context should be further pursued: the  
15 conventional definition of democracy might change; the form of democracy might change.  
16  
17

18  
19 Are there Asian codes or norms of democratic governance? Is there an “Asian worldview” for active  
20 citizenship in the future? Should there be? If the so-called Asian norm of democracy is accepted,  
21 could it become just another avenue for autocrats to conveniently use democracy (or elections) as a  
22 façade behind which to maintain their power, as occurs in many countries right now? [20]  
23 Asia has its own history, traditions, and cultures, and this multi-faceted uniqueness should be taken  
24 into account [21]. The demands of the implementation of democratic governance will consequently  
25 differ [22].  
26

27  
28 Some characteristics might add up to different collective views of democracy. These are: (a) lack of  
29 experience in democracy, which might affect people’s imagined picture of it; (b) past experience of  
30 colonization (or the lack of it); (c) ancient countries versus newly independent countries; (d) levels of  
31 globalization: varying levels of media and cultural penetration, which might change the idea of  
32 citizenship being tied to nationality; (e) different types of social changes: more  
33 structured/engineered (e.g. China) versus more fluid (e.g. India); (f) different demography: baby  
34 boom countries (Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, etc.: looking for more job security, provision of  
35 economic opportunities, better access to ICT, and inclusiveness-based governance reforms) versus  
36 rapidly aging societies (China, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and, to some extent, Malaysia: seek more  
37 social spending, health care, etc., and demand legitimacy of governance through better institutions  
38 and more equality).  
39  
40

41  
42 In this context, how do we shape democracy at local and national levels in Asia? Will there be  
43 regionalism and regionalized norms within Asia, for the whole of Asia, or something else? With the  
44 fastest growing population being the middle class, how will their attitudes change the face of  
45 democracy in the region?  
46  
47

48  
49 The forum participants hoped that democratization in Asia would occur in waves, as in Eastern  
50 Europe through the 1970s to '90s. With the help of the internet and the decline of government  
51 censorship, awareness of rights and demands for democracy, the participants hoped, would be  
52 contagious; an “Asian Monsoon,” much like the Arab Spring, was hoped for.  
53

## 54 **6. Scenarios** 55

56  
57 Using the integrated scenario method, many alternatives were developed by the five groups. We  
58 have synthesized the material. The first three are certainly preferred, and the final scenario is  
59 developed as a warning, as a future that could easily occur, and that should be avoided. The scenario  
60

1 format differed to some extent from the visions in that they could push boundaries, for example,  
2 imagining new social technologies such as air-pooling. As well, “a day in the life of a citizen” of each  
3 future was articulated, often in a role-playing format.

#### 4 5 *6.1 Scenario one: Asia awakens*

6  
7 In this scenario, Asia awakes to a world emphasizing a contributing, informed, and empowered  
8 citizenry. It is a better society because everyone actively contributes and works together. People are  
9 highly tolerant of all sorts of diversity—sexual, social, economic, ethnic and religious, etc. This  
10 scenario emerges because of dramatic developments in digital technology (personalized, real time  
11 feedback, and affordable), the success of the sustainability (green movement) and because the rise  
12 of demographic cohorts – ageing, the women’s movement, the rise of digital natives - focused not  
13 just on economic wealth but on personal and collective health.

14  
15  
16 There is a dynamic balance between nature and humanity, between personal needs and work needs,  
17 and between body and mind. Work patterns and schedules are highly flexible to give individuals time  
18 with family and time to take part in community. Crime and poverty are drastically reduced as a result  
19 of effective involvement of the citizenry. Clean, safe, and nutritionally-balanced food is supplied by  
20 local farms or community gardens, where everyone contributes a portion of their time and effort.  
21 The society is considered “advanced,” not on the basis of its economic achievements but because of  
22 the happiness of its people.

23  
24  
25  
26 With extensive technological support, this is a participatory future with a free, engaged, responsible,  
27 and informed citizenry [23]. Technology in 2030 enables citizens to vote more effectively on local  
28 issues. People use technology to review referenda, to obtain information about public affairs, to  
29 communicate their views, to cast votes on a daily basis. People check on governance just as they  
30 check their emails or Facebook today. Governance updates are a part of the daily news routine,  
31 providing constant, real-time feedback. Of course, information exchange among citizens is  
32 thoroughly equitable. Because everyone is actively and effectively involved in governance, street  
33 protests are no longer needed.

34  
35  
36  
37 E-Governance helps in creating a better-organized civil society. It allows citizens to file complaints or  
38 to report everyday civil problems through widely located and well-functioning cameras that can be  
39 connected to personal handheld devices, such as smart phones. Since problems are easily reported  
40 by all and promptly responded to by the government, everyday living is made easy and comfortable.  
41 For civil disputes that cannot be settled by the parties, residents in the relevant district are allowed  
42 to vote on the matter online. They can also use this system to evaluate all the services they use and  
43 to obtain information on everything needed for the coming day. Big data is available for assessment:  
44 the public budget, waste management, etc.

45  
46  
47 Citizens in this society are well aware that the well-connected surveillance system is double-edged—  
48 it provides efficiency and security while sacrificing a certain amount of privacy. Citizens, however,  
49 are aware of their rights and responsibilities.

#### 50 51 52 *6.2 Scenario two: Asia is green*

53  
54 The second scenario developed was, “Asia is Green.” In this scenario, technology works hand in hand  
55 with green ideology. Human wellbeing, technology, and the environment have reached a delightful  
56 balance. The scenario emerged because of the disastrous collapse of the unstable business model of  
57 the 2010s. This economic catastrophe pushed governments to make substantial changes, fully  
58 aligning political systems with a green and sustainable future. Green parties were elected  
59



1 everywhere. This scenario emerges because of the crisis caused by climate change and the need to  
2 make immediate and long-term changes. While similar to the earlier scenario, it differentiates itself  
3 by the primacy of natural capital, of environmental values and technologies that support them.

4 In-house, energy-efficient, high-tech systems assess people's body condition and biometrics to  
5 ensure maximum productivity. For instance, this technology predicts the time one will wake up and  
6 smartly prepares food and transport needs. The system aligns a person's biological clock with the  
7 business needs of the day. It also generates meal suggestions according to a person's health and  
8 planned activities.  
9

10  
11 People in this future use vehicles running on environmentally-friendly fuel. Wind energy is utilized  
12 and commercialized, so the environmental impact of flying in a jet is negated. "Air pools", —which  
13 allow people to own shares in aircraft and use them for trips—are as common as car pools were  
14 decades ago. In fact, de-urbanization everywhere has decreased the need for commuting in many  
15 parts of the continent.  
16  
17

18  
19 When flying, passports are no longer needed because the political system now allows citizens of all  
20 countries to freely move across borders. Job opportunities are completely equal. Job offers are  
21 solely based on qualifications—not gender-, race-, nationality-, or age-specific. As for business and  
22 finance, people trade in social stock exchanges.  
23

### 24 *6.3 Scenario three: the fresh floating market*

25  
26 In this scenario, democratic governance is like a fresh food market, which resembles a Thai floating  
27 market. The market is a free and open space in which citizens participate. In contrast, in the old  
28 system, everything was monopolized by a few rich and powerful people. For most people the system  
29 was not free, fair, or secure. The situation was so dire that people started to realize they had to bring  
30 down the corrupt elites and create a new type of market. Concrete changes in market governance  
31 and judicial integrity consequently occurred.  
32  
33

34  
35 In the end, a change in leadership, with women in power, started to re-shape how people viewed  
36 the system. Thus, the women's movement – and the focus on alternative futures, cooperation,  
37 equity – is a critical driver. Things started to change, and the governance structure is now more open.  
38 Everybody has ownership and receives dividends at the end of the year; opportunities are provided  
39 to all stakeholders to take leadership roles. Everyone has a share; happiness indices have emerged.  
40 People from different areas are free to express their views and have them heard. Freeness and  
41 openness also attracts young people to join in. Women and minorities are finally well-represented  
42 and active in this system.  
43  
44

45  
46 This scenario presents a very rule-based society that prohibits deception, just as vendors in any  
47 market would not tolerate cheating. The social pressure to do good deeds plays a role in this future.  
48 People in the system must work in a decentralized way but still according to rules.  
49

50  
51 Any critiques of the market structure can be expressed through the internet, and other egalitarian  
52 and equalizing technologies; this encourages active civic participation. Accountability is more  
53 instantaneous now and people no longer have to wait four or five years for political terms expire.  
54 The nature of leadership has changed: it takes a managerial role, much as it would in the governance  
55 of corporations or NGOs. Elected officials are not even necessary to the system.  
56  
57

### 58 *6.4 Scenario four: Asia in decline 2030*

1 In this outlier future, the continuation of realism, of power politics continues. Regional conflicts,  
 2 such as the South China Sea conflict, and the India-China and India-Pakistan border disputes escalate.  
 3 Religious fundamentalism and extremism across society is increasingly reflected in politics.  
 4 Consequently, there is a rise of strong-man rule—personality-based, charismatic, “cult” figures take  
 5 power. A pushback by autocrats is observed, reminiscent of the Assad regime in Syria. The typical  
 6 political leadership that we know today is void—the voiceless are marginalized from society and  
 7 seek a charismatic leader to save them. The average global temperature rises by two degrees, and  
 8 sea levels rise with it. Reflecting the dysfunction of political systems in many nations, new creations  
 9 of the city state emerge as big cities start to break away from nation-states. Exclusivist ideologies  
 10 arise.  
 11

12 The newspaper headlines of this dystopia run something like this:

- 13 • Member states cut funding: UN bankrupt;
- 14 • Japan returns to isolationism;
- 15 • Association of Asian City States replaces regional free trade association;
- 16 • Autocracy on the rise across Asia;
- 17 • Climate change: 20% of Asia flooded by sea level rise.

18 Systemic forces in Asian society include the rise of modern “feudalism”, and a general decline in  
 19 innovation owing to a lack of incentives. The dominant worldview is “everyman for himself” and  
 20 salvation through the rise of charismatic religious leaders. There are echoes of Orwell’s Nineteen  
 21 Eighty-Four.  
 22

23 Other outliers were also articulated but not fully developed. These included climate change leading  
 24 to Eco-fascism. Dramatically enhanced fragmentation leads to China falling apart. But there were  
 25 also positive outliers. For example, in one scenario participants imagined a confederation of Asian  
 26 states, an Asian Union, with extensive trade, a security regime, and institutional networks and high  
 27 order organizations to promote democracy.  
 28

## 29 7. Conclusion

30 The Asia 2030 event was unique and productive for a number of reasons. Firstly, the event was co-  
 31 sponsored by a number of organizations and institutes, and thus, cooperation was built into the  
 32 event. Second, Asia 2030, the topic was unique in an Asian setting. While there have been earlier  
 33 conferences [21] and expert meetings [22, 24, 25] on the subject, this was the first time an  
 34 anticipatory action learning event was held in Asia and focused on the long term futures of Asia.  
 35 Participants appreciated having time for methodologically focused discussions on the future and for  
 36 space to envision desired futures. Generally, workshops focus on the present or when they focus on  
 37 the focus on the future it is based on personal impressions or on the double variable method, which  
 38 boxes the future. Third, while the alternative scenarios explore possible futures—and in themselves  
 39 of scholarly value—the strength and power of the workshop was the articulation of desired visions  
 40 of the future, their supporting drivers and the underlying narratives or deep metaphors. Visions, as  
 41 Boulding and Polak [26, 27] have argued, pull us forward toward the future, even as there are  
 42 weights – mindsets, institutional blockages, resource constraints – that challenge the realization of  
 43 the preferred. The push of the future, drivers, make it more likely that certain visions will occur.  
 44 Fourth, the futures approach successfully challenged the “business-as-usual” realist paradigm. While  
 45 participants acknowledged that there is a great degree of uncertainty as to the emerging future,  
 46 they were confident that democratic governance in Asia would be transformed by 2030. Lastly, this  
 47 workshop is part of a broader process of engagement—the Asia dialogue series—by Oxfam and  
 48 partners on other specific topics, linked to creating alternative Asian futures. Earlier workshops were  
 49 held on the topics of “Democratic spaces in Southeast Asia,” “Enhancing accountability in the midst  
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1 of decentralization” and “We are the solutions: how active citizens can bring real solutions to  
2 development. “ [28] Forthcoming workshop includes a series in Bangkok on urban futures [29]. The  
3 next step of this process would be far deeper inclusion of citizens in this process of anticipatory  
4 action learning. This would continue the process of moving from scientific expert meetings, to  
5 futurist expert meetings, to multi-stakeholder meetings, to true citizen foresight workshops, with  
6 the ideal of the inclusions of hundreds of thousands in a participatory foresight process.

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Table 1: CLA—Contribution, Inclusion, Empowerment

	<b>Deconstructed from the Viewpoint of Citizens - The Preferred Future</b>	<b>Current Reality</b>	<b>Reconstructed—The Plausible Future</b>
<b>Litany</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Key Measurement: zero tolerance to corruption</li> <li>•Opportunities for citizens engagement</li> <li>•Decentralized/engaged local government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Middle-class apathy</li> <li>•Polarization</li> <li>•Inequality</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Gini-coefficient downward tending</li> <li>•Gender empowerment upward tending</li> <li>•Sustainable development indicators</li> </ul>
<b>Systemic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Multi-stakeholder</li> <li>•Radical shift in approach to infrastructure</li> <li>•Tech-enabled, real-time, citizen-driven engagement</li> <li>•Direct citizen engagement+ higher transparency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Monopoly plus elite capture</li> <li>•Weak legal enforcement</li> <li>•Relative economic stability</li> <li>•No accountability to citizens</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Open government/open data</li> <li>•Private sector innovates on the ground</li> <li>•Corporate social responsibility</li> <li>•Accountability</li> <li>•Transparency</li> </ul>
<b>Worldview</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Each person can make a difference</li> <li>•Common future—we are in this together</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Patriarchy: leader knows best</li> <li>•Citizens are unruly and can't be trusted</li> <li>•Deterministic view</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Share the wealth</li> <li>•Together we achieve more</li> </ul>
<b>Myths &amp; Metaphor</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Ants: collaborative and efficient</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•The God King</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Tipping point: Boat at edge of cliff</li> </ul>

Table 2: CLA—Survival for All

	<b>Deconstructed from the View of Citizens</b>	<b>Current Reality</b>	<b>Reconstructed Reality—The Plausible Future</b>
<b>Litany</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Soft indicators are qualitative and hard to calculate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Quantifiable financial indicators are the metric of progress</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Balanced worldview of human development</li> </ul>
<b>Systemic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Use soft indicators alongside to measure latent potential/real human development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Inertia of using existing economic indicators dictated by the elites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Reframe the language of growth and development</li> </ul>

<b>Worldview</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Anti-Darwinism</li> <li>• But not enough resources to save everyone</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Darwinian</li> <li>• Economic and financial focused</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inclusiveness measures: at par or greater than macroeconomic/financial indicators</li> </ul>
<b>Myths &amp; Metaphor</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bees: Survival for all</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Survival of the fittest</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Care for the other</li> </ul>

Table 3: CLA—Green, Borderless, Equity-Based Citizenship

	<b>Current Trend Continues—2030</b>	<b>Preferred Reality—2030</b>	<b>Reconstructed Preferred Reality (Citizens' View) — 2030</b>
<b>Litany</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proteins for high productivity</li> <li>• Voting doesn't matter</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Employees promoted for demonstrating healthy behaviours</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Green party in charge</li> <li>• Collaborative consumption</li> </ul>
<b>Systemic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incentivised: production at all cost</li> <li>• Fierce competition</li> <li>• Pharmaceuticals to promote growth</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New technologies</li> <li>• Change in incentive</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Green, sustainable mechanism</li> <li>• Innovative city planning</li> <li>• Cost sharing</li> <li>• Green technologies</li> </ul>
<b>Worldview</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fast growth, consumption</li> <li>• Health you can buy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sustainability</li> <li>• Green</li> <li>• Equal society</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Green world marries capitalist leading to "green capitalism"</li> </ul>
<b>Myths &amp; Metaphor</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hyper body</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Healthy body</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Smart body</li> </ul>

Table 4: CLA—Informed, Capable, Free and Responsible Citizens

	<b>Elite Point of View</b>	<b>Poor Child Point of View</b>	<b>Activist Point of View (Preferred Scenario)</b>
<b>Litany</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social inequality makes democratic governance dysfunctional</li> <li>• Vested interests, corruption, double standards</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inequality, discrimination and rights violations in everyday life</li> <li>• Survival mode</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduced dependency</li> <li>• Rich men committing crimes are imprisoned (all equal before the law)</li> <li>• People's movements, civil society networks</li> </ul>

<b>Systemic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No power-sharing, dynastic politics</li> <li>• Resources owned by a minority</li> <li>• Elite-driven economy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vote for populist policies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Free market bringing equilibrium</li> <li>• Redistribution</li> <li>• Participatory/deliberative process</li> </ul>
<b>Worldview</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Power = zero-sum game</li> <li>• Autocracy: elites know best</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Complacency; hopelessness</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deliberative and negotiated</li> <li>• Equity in democracy</li> </ul>
<b>Myths &amp; Metaphor</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Theme song: "Another Brick in the Wall"</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Theme song: "I Want to Break Free"</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Theme song: "Imagine"/"We are the World"</li> </ul>

Table 5: CLA—Floating Fresh Market

	<b>Current Reality</b>	<b>Reconstructed Future</b>
<b>Litany</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Non-functioning, unrepresentative, manipulated and captured institutions</li> <li>• Corruption and regulatory capture</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More Koreas and Taiwans</li> <li>• Mature middle classes</li> <li>• Contestability</li> </ul>
<b>Systemic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unequal, rigid, and fossilized power structures</li> <li>• Entrenched interests</li> <li>• Elite captures, media captures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expanding middle classes</li> <li>• Local, decentralized governments</li> <li>• Previously marginalized groups are included</li> <li>• NGOs and media as systematic watchdog</li> </ul>
<b>Worldview</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Darwinian worldview</li> <li>• Hierarchy is legitimate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New elites; diverse interests</li> <li>• Level playing field</li> </ul>
<b>Myth &amp; Metaphor</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monopolized corporation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Floating fresh food market</li> </ul>